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This article is the second part of a review of recent empirical and theoretical developments usually grouped
under the term Econophysics. In the first part, we have reviewed statistical properties of financial times
series, statistics exhibited on order books and discussed some studies of correlations of assets. This second
part deals with models in Econophysics through the point of view of agent-based modelling. Amongst a large
number of multi-agent-based models, we have identified three representative areas. First, using previous work
originally presented in the fields of behavioural finance and market microstructure theory, econophysicists
have developed agent-based models of order-driven markets that are extensively presented here. Second,
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the first part of the review, empirical developments
in Econophysics have been studied. We have pointed
out that some of these widely known “stylized facts”
are already at the heart of financial models. But many
facts, especially the newer statistical properties of or-
der books, are not yet taken into account. As advo-
cated by many during the financial crisis in 2007-2008
(see e.g. Bouchaud (2008); Lux and Westerhoff (2009);
Farmer and Foley (2009)), agent-based models should
have a great role to play in future financial modelling.
In economic models, there is usually the representative
agent, who is “perfectly rational” and uses the “utility
maximization” principle while taking actions. Instead
the multi-agent models that have originated from sta-
tistical physics considerations have allowed to go beyond
the prototype theories with the “representative” agent in
traditional economics. In this second part of our review,
we present recent developments of agent-based models in
Econophysics.
There are, of course, many reviews and books al-
ready published in this areas (see e.g. Bouchaud et al.
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(2009), Lux and Westerhoff (2009), Samanidou et al.
(2007), Yakovenko and Rosser (2009), Chatterjee and
Chakrabarti (2007), Challet et al. (2004), Coolen (2005),
etc.). We will present here our perspectives in three rep-
resentative areas.
II. AGENT-BASED MODELLING OF ORDER BOOKS
A. Introduction
Although known, at least partly, for a long time – Man-
delbrot (1963) gives a reference for a paper dealing with
non-normality of price time series in 1915, followed by
several others in the 1920’s – “stylized facts” have often
been left aside when modelling financial markets. They
were even often referred to as “anomalous” character-
istics, as if observations failed to comply with theory.
Much has been done these past fifteen years in order to
address this challenge and provide new models that can
reproduce these facts. These recent developments have
been built on top of early attempts at modelling mech-
anisms of financial markets with agents. For example,
Stigler (1964), investigating some rules of the SEC1, or
Garman (1976), investigating double-auction microstruc-
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2ture, belong to those historical works. It seems that the
first modern attempts at that type of models were made
in the field of behavioural finance. This field aims at
improving financial modelling based on the psychology
and sociology of the investors. Models are built with
agents who can exchange shares of stocks according to
exogenously defined utility functions reflecting their pref-
erences and risk aversions. LeBaron (2006b) shows that
this type of modelling offers good flexibility for repro-
ducing some of the stylized facts and LeBaron (2006a)
provides a review of that type of model. However, al-
though achieving some of their goals, these models suf-
fer from many drawbacks: first, they are very complex,
and it may be a very difficult task to identify the role of
their numerous parameters and the types of dependence
to these parameters; second, the chosen utility functions
do not necessarily reflect what is observed on the mech-
anisms of a financial market.
A sensible change in modelling appears with much
simpler models implementing only well-identified and
presumably realistic “behaviour”: Cont and Bouchaud
(2000) uses noise traders that are subject to “herding”,
i.e. form random clusters of traders sharing the same
view on the market. The idea is used in Raberto et al.
(2001) as well. A complementary approach is to char-
acterize traders as fundamentalists, chartists or noise
traders. Lux and Marchesi (2000) propose an agent-
based model in which these types of traders interact. In
all these models, the price variation directly results from
the excess demand: at each time step, all agents submit
orders and the resulting price is computed. Therefore,
everything is cleared at each time step and there is no
structure of order book to keep track of orders.
One big step is made with models really taking into
account limit orders and keeping them in an order book
once submitted and not executed. Chiarella and Iori
(2002) build an agent-based model where all traders sub-
mit orders depending on the three elements identified
in Lux and Marchesi (2000): chartists, fundamentalists,
noise. Orders submitted are then stored in a persistent
order book. In fact, one of the first simple models with
this feature was proposed in Bak et al. (1997). In this
model, orders are particles moving along a price line, and
each collision is a transaction. Due to numerous caveats
in this model, the authors propose in the same paper an
extension with fundamentalist and noise traders in the
spirit of the models previously evoked. Maslov (2000)
goes further in the modelling of trading mechanisms by
taking into account fixed limit orders and market orders
that trigger transactions, and really simulating the or-
der book. This model was analytically solved using a
mean-field approximation by Slanina (2001).
Following this trend of modelling, the more or less “ra-
tional” agents composing models in economics tends to
vanish and be replaced by the notion of flows: orders are
not submitted any more by an agent following a strate-
gic behaviour, but are viewed as an arriving flow whose
properties are to be determined by empirical observa-
tions of market mechanisms. Thus, the modelling of or-
der books calls for more “stylized facts”, i.e. empirical
properties that could be observed on a large number of
order-driven markets. Biais et al. (1995) is a thorough
empirical study of the order flows in the Paris Bourse
a few years after its complete computerization. Mar-
ket orders, limit orders, time of arrivals and placement
are studied. Bouchaud et al. (2002) and Potters and
Bouchaud (2003) provide statistical features on the order
book itself. These empirical studies, that have been re-
viewed in the first part of this review, are the foundation
for “zero-intelligence” models, in which “stylized facts”
are expected to be reproduced by the properties of the
order flows and the structure of order book itself, without
considering exogenous “rationality”. Challet and Stinch-
combe (2001) propose a simple model of order flows: limit
orders are deposited in the order book and can be re-
moved if not executed, in a simple deposition-evaporation
process. Bouchaud et al. (2002) use this type of model
with empirical distribution as inputs. As of today, the
most complete empirical model is to our knowledge Mike
and Farmer (2008), where order placement and cancel-
lation models are proposed and fitted on empirical data.
Finally, new challenges arise as scientists try to identify
simple mechanisms that allow an agent-based model to
reproduce non-trivial behaviours: herding behaviour in-
Cont and Bouchaud (2000), dynamic price placement in
Preis et al. (2007), threshold behaviour in Cont (2007),
etc.
In this part we review some of these models. This sur-
vey is of course far from exhaustive, and we have just
selected models that we feel are representative of a spe-
cific trend of modelling.
B. Early order-driven market modelling: Market
microstructure and policy issues
The pioneering works in simulation of financial mar-
kets were aimed to study market regulations. The very
first one, Stigler (1964), tries to investigate the effect of
regulations of the SEC on American stock markets, using
empirical data from the 20’s and the 50’s. Twenty years
later, at the start of the computerization of financial mar-
kets, Hakansson et al. (1985) implements a simulator in
order to test the feasibility of automated market making.
Instead of reviewing the huge microstructure literature,
we refer the reader to the well-known books by O’Hara
(1995) or Hasbrouck (2007), for example, for a panorama
of this branch of finance. However, by presenting a small
selection of early models, we here underline the ground-
ing of recent order book modelling.
1. A pioneer order book model
To our knowledge, the first attempt to simulate a fi-
nancial market was by Stigler (1964). This paper was
3a biting and controversial reaction to the Report of the
Special Study of the Securities Markets of the SEC (Co-
hen (1963a)), whose aim was to “study the adequacy
of rules of the exchange and that the New York stock
exchange undertakes to regulate its members in all of
their activities” (Cohen (1963b)). According to Stigler,
this SEC report lacks rigorous tests when investigating
the effects of regulation on financial markets. Stating
that “demand and supply are [...] erratic flows with se-
quences of bids and asks dependent upon the random
circumstances of individual traders”, he proposes a sim-
ple simulation model to investigate the evolution of the
market. In this model, constrained by simulation capa-
bility in 1964, price is constrained within L = 10 ticks.
(Limit) orders are randomly drawn, in trade time, as fol-
lows: they can be bid or ask orders with equal probability,
and their price level is uniformly distributed on the price
grid. Each time an order crosses the opposite best quote,
it is a market order. All orders are of size one. Orders
not executed N = 25 time steps after their submission
are cancelled. Thus, N is the maximum number of orders
available in the order book.
In the original paper, a run of a hundred trades was
manually computed using tables of random numbers.
Of course, no particular results concerning the “stylized
facts” of financial time series was expected at that time.
However, in his review of some order book models, Slan-
ina (2008) makes simulations of a similar model, with
parameters L = 5000 and N = 5000, and shows that
price returns are not Gaussian: their distribution ex-
hibits power law with exponent 0.3, far from empirical
data. As expected, the limitation L is responsible for a
sharp cut-off of the tails of this distribution.
2. Microstructure of the double auction
Garman (1976) provides an early study of the double
auction market with a point of view that does not ignore
temporal structure, and really defines order flows. Price
is discrete and constrained to be within {p1, pL}. Buy
and sell orders are assumed to be submitted according to
two Poisson processes of intensities λ and µ. Each time
an order crosses the best opposite quote, it is a market or-
der. All quantities are assumed to be equal to one. The
aim of the author was to provide an empirical study of
the market microstructure. The main result of its Poisson
model was to support the idea that negative correlation
of consecutive price changes is linked the microstructure
of the double auction exchange. This paper is very in-
teresting because it can be seen as precursor that clearly
sets the challenges of order book modelling. First, the
mathematical formulation is promising. With its fixed
constrained prices, Garman (1976) can define the state
of the order book at a given time as the vector (ni)i=1,...,L
of awaiting orders (negative quantity for bid orders, pos-
itive for ask orders). Future analytical models will use
similar vector formulations that can be cast it into known
mathematical processes in order to extract analytical re-
sults – see e.g. Cont et al. (2008) reviewed below. Second,
the author points out that, although the Poisson model
is simple, analytical solution is hard to work out, and he
provides Monte Carlo simulation. The need for numerical
and empirical developments is a constant in all following
models. Third, the structural question is clearly asked in
the conclusion of the paper: “Does the auction-market
model imply the characteristic leptokurtosis seen in em-
pirical security price changes?”. The computerization of
markets that was about to take place when this research
was published – Toronto’s CATS2 opened a year later
in 1977 – motivated many following papers on the sub-
ject. As an example, let us cite here Hakansson et al.
(1985), who built a model to choose the right mechanism
for setting clearing prices in a multi-securities market.
3. Zero-intelligence
In the models by Stigler (1964) and Garman (1976),
orders are submitted in a purely random way on the grid
of possible prices. Traders do not observe the market
here and do not act according to a given strategy. Thus,
these two contributions clearly belong to a class of “zero-
intelligence” models. To our knowledge, Gode and Sun-
der (1993) is the first paper to introduce the expression
“zero-intelligence” in order to describe non-strategic be-
haviour of traders. It is applied to traders that submit
random orders in a double auction market. The expres-
sion has since been widely used in agent-based modelling,
sometimes in a slightly different meaning (see more recent
models described in this review). In Gode and Sunder
(1993), two types of zero-intelligence traders are stud-
ied. The first are unconstrained zero-intelligence traders.
These agents can submit random order at random prices,
within the allowed price range {1, . . . , L}. The second are
constrained zero-intelligence traders. These agents sub-
mit random orders as well, but with the constraint that
they cannot cross their given reference price pRi : con-
strained zero-intelligence traders are not allowed to buy
or sell at loss. The aim of the authors was to show
that double auction markets exhibit an intrinsic “alloca-
tive efficiency” (ratio between the total profit earned by
the traders divided by the maximum possible profit) even
with zero-intelligence traders. An interesting fact is that
in this experiment, price series resulting from actions by
zero-intelligence traders are much more volatile than the
ones obtained with constrained traders. This fact will
be confirmed in future models where “fundamentalists”
traders, having a reference price, are expected to stabi-
lize the market (see Wyart and Bouchaud (2007) or Lux
and Marchesi (2000) below). Note that the results have
been criticized by Cliff and Bruten (1997), who show that
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the theoretical equilibrium price may be an artefact of
the model. More precisely, the choice of traders’ demand
carry a lot of constraints that alone explain the observed
results.
Modern works in Econophysics owe a lot to these early
models or contributions. Starting in the mid-90’s, physi-
cists have proposed simple order book models directly
inspired from Physics, where the analogy “order ≡ par-
ticle” is emphasized. Three main contributions are pre-
sented in the next section.
C. Order-driven market modelling in Econophysics
1. The order book as a reaction-diffusion model
A very simple model directly taken from Physics was
presented in Bak et al. (1997). The authors consider a
market with N noise traders able to exchange one share
of stock at a time. Price p(t) at time t is constrained to
be an integer (i.e. price is quoted in number of ticks) with
an upper bound p¯: ∀t, p(t) ∈ {0, . . . , p¯}. Simulation is
initiated at time 0 with half of the agents asking for one
share of stock (buy orders, bid) with price:
pjb(0) ∈ {0, p¯/2}, j = 1, . . . , N/2, (1)
and the other half offering one share of stock (sell orders,
ask) with price:
pjs(0) ∈ {p¯/2, p¯}, j = 1, . . . , N/2. (2)
At each time step t, agents revise their offer by exactly
one tick, with equal probability to go up or down. There-
fore, at time t, each seller (resp. buyer) agent chooses his
new price as:
pjs(t+1) = p
j
s(t)±1 (resp. pjb(t+1) = pjb(t)±1 ). (3)
A transaction occurs when there exists (i, j) ∈
{1, . . . , N/2}2 such that pib(t + 1) = pjs(t+ 1). In such a
case the orders are removed and the transaction price is
recorded as the new price p(t). Once a transaction has
been recorded, two orders are placed at the extreme po-
sitions on the grid: pib(t + 1) = 0 and p
j
s(t + 1) = p¯. As
a consequence, the number of orders in the order book
remains constant and equal to the number of agents. In
figure 1, an illustration of these moving particles is given.
As pointed out by the authors, this process of simula-
tion is similar the reaction-diffusion model A + B → ∅
in Physics. In such a model, two types of particles are
inserted at each side of a pipe of length p¯ and move ran-
domly with steps of size 1. Each time two particles col-
lide, they’re annihilated and two new particles are in-
serted. The analogy is summarized in table I. Following
this analogy, it thus can be showed that the variation
TABLE I. Analogy between the A + B → ∅ reaction model
and the order book in Bak et al. (1997).
Physics Bak et al. (1997)
Particles Orders
Finite Pipe Order book
Collision Transaction
∆p(t) of the price p(t) verifies :
∆p(t) ∼ t1/4(ln( t
t0
))1/2. (4)
Thus, at long time scales, the series of price incre-
ments simulated in this model exhibit a Hurst exponent
H = 1/4. As for the stylized fact H ≈ 0.7, this sub-
diffusive behavior appears to be a step in the wrong direc-
tion compared to the random walk H = 1/2. Moreover,
Slanina (2008) points out that no fat tails are observed in
the distribution of the returns of the model, but rather
fits the empirical distribution with an exponential de-
cay. Other drawbacks of the model could be mentioned.
For example, the reintroduction of orders at each end of
the pipe leads to unrealistic shape of the order book, as
shown on figure 2. Actually here is the main draw-
back of the model: “moving” orders is highly unrealistic
as for modelling an order book, and since it does not
reproduce any known financial exchange mechanism, it
cannot be the base for any larger model. Therefore, at-
tempts by the authors to build several extensions of this
simple framework, in order to reproduce “stylized facts”
by adding fundamental traders, strategies, trends, etc.
are not of interest for us in this review. However, we feel
that the basic model as such is very interesting because
of its simplicity and its “particle” representation of an
order-driven market that has opened the way for more
realistic models.
2. Introducing market orders
Maslov (2000) keeps the zero-intelligence structure of
the Bak et al. (1997) model but adds more realistic fea-
FIG. 1. Illustration of the Bak, Paczuski and Shubik model:
white particles (buy orders, bid) moving from the left, black
particles (sell orders, ask) moving from the right. Reproduced
from Bak et al. (1997).
5FIG. 2. Snapshot of the limit order book in the Bak,
Paczuski and Shubik model. Reproduced from Bak et al.
(1997).
tures in the order placement and evolution of the mar-
ket. First, limit orders are submitted and stored in the
model, without moving. Second, limit orders are sub-
mitted around the best quotes. Third, market orders are
submitted to trigger transactions. More precisely, at each
time step, a trader is chosen to perform an action. This
trader can either submit a limit order with probability ql
or submit a market order with probability 1 − ql. Once
this choice is made, the order is a buy or sell order with
equal probability. All orders have a one unit volume.
As usual, we denote p(t) the current price. In case the
submitted order at time step t + 1 is a limit ask (resp.
bid) order, it is placed in the book at price p(t) + ∆
(resp. p(t) − ∆), ∆ being a random variable uniformly
distributed in ]0;∆M = 4]. In case the submitted order
at time step t + 1 is a market order, one order at the
opposite best quote is removed and the price p(t + 1) is
recorded. In order to prevent the number of orders in
the order book from large increase, two mechanisms are
proposed by the author: either keeping a fixed maximum
number of orders (by discarding new limit orders when
this maximum is reached), or removing them after a fixed
lifetime if they have not been executed.
Numerical simulations show that this model exhibits
non-Gaussian heavy-tailed distributions of returns. On
FIG. 3. Empirical probability density functions of the price
increments in the Maslov model. In inset, log-log plot of the
positive increments. Reproduced from Maslov (2000).
figure 3, the empirical probability density of the price
increments for several time scales are plotted. For a time
scale δt = 1, the author fit the tails distribution with a
power law with exponent 3.0, i.e. reasonable compared
to empirical value. However, the Hurst exponent of the
price series is still H = 1/4 with this model. It should
also be noted that Slanina (2001) proposed an analytical
study of the model using a mean-field approximation (See
below section II E).
This model brings very interesting innovations in or-
der book simulation: order book with (fixed) limit or-
ders, market orders, necessity to cancel orders waiting
too long in the order book. These features are of prime
importance in any following order book model.
3. The order book as a deposition-evaporation process
Challet and Stinchcombe (2001) continue the work of
Bak et al. (1997) and Maslov (2000), and develop the
analogy between dynamics of an order book and an in-
finite one dimensional grid, where particles of two types
(ask and bid) are subject to three types of events: de-
position (limit orders), annihilation (market orders) and
evaporation (cancellation). Note that annihilation oc-
curs when a particle is deposited on a site occupied by
a particle of another type. The analogy is summarized
in table II. Hence, the model goes as follows: At each
time step, a bid (resp. ask) order is deposited with prob-
ability λ at a price n(t) drawn according to a Gaussian
distribution centred on the best ask a(t) (resp. best bid
b(t)) and with variance depending linearly on the spread
s(t) = a(t)− b(t): σ(t) = Ks(t)+C. If n(t) > a(t) (resp.
n(t) < b(t)), then it is a market order: annihilation takes
place and the price is recorded. Otherwise, it is a limit
order and it is stored in the book. Finally, each limit or-
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cess and the order book in Challet and Stinchcombe (2001).
Physics Challet and Stinchcombe (2001)
Particles Orders
Infinite lattice Order book
Deposition Limit orders submission
Evaporation Limit orders cancellation
Annihilation Transaction
FIG. 4. Average return 〈r∆t〉 as a function of ∆t for differ-
ent sets of parameters and simultaneous depositions allowed
in the Challet and Stinchcombe model. Reproduced from
Challet and Stinchcombe (2001).
der stored in the book has a probability δ to be cancelled
(evaporation).
Figure 4 shows the average return as a function of the
time scale. It appears that the series of price returns sim-
ulated with this model exhibit a Hurst exponentH = 1/4
for short time scales, and that tends toH = 1/2 for larger
time scales. This behaviour might be the consequence of
the random evaporation process (which was not modelled
in Maslov (2000), where H = 1/4 for large time scales).
Although some modifications of the process (more than
one order per time step) seem to shorten the sub-diffusive
region, it is clear that no over-diffusive behaviour is ob-
served.
D. Empirical zero-intelligence models
The three models presented in the previous section II C
have successively isolated essential mechanisms that are
to be used when simulating a “realistic” market: one or-
der is the smallest entity of the model; the submission of
one order is the time dimension (i.e. event time is used,
not an exogenous time defined by market clearing and
“tatonnement” on exogenous supply and demand func-
tions); submission of market orders (as such in Maslov
(2000), as “crossing limit orders” in Challet and Stinch-
combe (2001)) and cancellation of orders are taken into
account. On the one hand, one may try to describe these
mechanisms using a small number of parameters, using
Poisson process with constant rates for order flows, con-
stant volumes, etc. This might lead to some analytically
tractable models, as will be described in section II E. On
the other hand, one may try to fit more complex em-
pirical distributions to market data without analytical
concern.
This type of modelling is best represented by Mike and
Farmer (2008). It is the first model that proposes an ad-
vanced calibration on the market data as for order place-
ment and cancellation methods. As for volume and time
of arrivals, assumptions of previous models still hold: all
orders have the same volume, discrete event time is used
for simulation, i.e. one order (limit or market) is submit-
ted per time step. Following Challet and Stinchcombe
(2001), there is no distinction between market and limit
orders, i.e. market orders are limit orders that are sub-
mitted across the spread s(t). More precisely, at each
time step, one trading order is simulated: an ask (resp.
bid) trading order is randomly placed at n(t) = a(t)+ δa
(resp. n(t) = b(t) + δb) according to a Student dis-
tribution with scale and degrees of freedom calibrated
on market data. If an ask (resp. bid) order satisfies
δa < −s(t) = b(t) − a(t) (resp. δb > s(t) = a(t) − b(t)),
then it is a buy (resp. sell) market order and a transac-
tion occurs at price a(t) (resp. b(t).
During a time step, several cancellations of orders may
occur. The authors propose an empirical distribution for
cancellation based on three components for a given order:
• the position in the order book, measured as the
ratio y(t) = ∆(t)∆(0) where ∆(t) is the distance of the
order from the opposite best quote at time t,
• the order book imbalance, measured by the in-
dicator Nimb(t) =
Na(t)
Na(t)+Nb(t)
(resp. Nimb(t) =
Nb(t)
Na(t)+Nb(t)
) for ask (resp. bid) orders, where Na(t)
and Nb(t) are the number of orders at ask and bid
in the book at time t,
• the total number N(t) = Na(t)+Nb(t) of orders in
the book.
Their empirical study leads them to assume that the
cancellation probability has an exponential dependance
on y(t), a linear one in Nimb and finally decreases ap-
proximately as 1/Nt(t) as for the total number of orders.
Thus, the probability P (C|y(t), Nimb(t), Nt(t)) to cancel
an ask order at time t is formally written :
P (C|y(t), Nimb(t), Nt(t)) = A(1−e−y(t))(Nimb(t)+B) 1
Nt(t)
,
(5)
where the constants A and B are to be fitted on market
data. Figure 5 shows that this empirical formula provides
a quite good fit on market data.
7FIG. 5. Lifetime of orders for simulated data in the Mike
and Farmer model, compared to the empirical data used for
fitting. Reproduced from Mike and Farmer (2008).
FIG. 6. Cumulative distribution of returns in the Mike
and Farmer model, compared to the empirical data used for
fitting. Reproduced from Mike and Farmer (2008).
Finally, the authors mimic the observed long memory
of order signs by simulating a fractional Brownian mo-
tion. The auto-covariance function Γ(t) of the increments
of such a process exhibits a slow decay :
Γ(k) ∼ H(2H − 1)t2H−2 (6)
and it is therefore easy to reproduce exponent β of the
decay of the empirical autocorrelation function of order
signs observed on the market with H = 1− β/2.
The results of this empirical model are quite satisfying
as for return and spread distribution. The distribution
of returns exhibit fat tails which are in agreement with
empirical data, as shown on figure 6. The spread distri-
bution is also very well reproduced. As their empirical
model has been built on the data of only one stock, the
authors test their model on 24 other data sets of stocks
on the same market and find for half of them a good
agreement between empirical and simulated properties.
However, the bad results of the other half suggest that
such a model is still far from being “universal”.
Despite these very nice results, some drawbacks have
to be pointed out. The first one is the fact that the stabil-
ity of the simulated order book is far from ensured. Sim-
ulations using empirical parameters in the simulations
may bring situations where the order book is emptied by
large consecutive market orders. Thus, the authors re-
quire that there is at least two orders in each side of the
book. This exogenous trick might be important, since
it is activated precisely in the case of rare events that
influence the tails of the distributions. Also, the orig-
inal model does not focus on volatility clustering. Gu
and Zhou (2009) propose a variant that tackles this fea-
ture. Another important drawback of the model is the
way order signs are simulated. As noted by the authors,
using an exogenous fractional Brownian motion leads to
correlated price returns, which is in contradiction with
empirical stylized facts. We also find that at long time
scales it leads to a dramatic increase of volatility. As we
have seen in the first part of the review, the correlation
of trade signs can be at least partly seen as an artefact
of execution strategies. Therefore this element is one of
the numerous that should be taken into account when
“programming” the agents of the model. In order to do
so, we have to leave the (quasi) “zero-intelligence” world
and see how modelling based on heterogeneous agents
might help to reproduce non-trivial behaviours. Prior to
this development below in II F, we briefly review some
analytical works on the “zero-intelligence” models.
E. Analytical treatments of zero-intelligence models
In this section we present some analytical results ob-
tained on zero-intelligence models where processes are
kept sufficiently simple so that a mean-field approxima-
tion may be derived (Slanina (2001)) or probabilities con-
ditionaly to the state of the order book may be computed
(Cont et al. (2008)). The key assumptions here are such
that the process describing the order book is stationary.
This allows either to write a stable density equation, or
to fit the model into a nice mathematical framework such
as ergodic Markov chains.
1. Mean-field theory
Slanina (2001) proposes an analytical treatment of the
model introduced by Maslov (2000) and reviewed above.
Let us briefly described the formalism used. The main
hypothesis is the following: on each side of the current
price level, the density of limit orders is uniform and con-
stant (and ρ+ on the ask side, ρ− on the bid side). In
that sense, this is a “mean-field” approximation since the
individual position of a limit order is not taken into ac-
count. Assuming we are in a stable state, the arrival of
a market order of size s on the ask (resp. bid) side will
make the price change by x+ = s/ρ+ (resp. x− = s/ρ−).
8It is then observed that the transformations of the vector
X = (x+, x−) occurring at each event (new limit order,
new buy market order, new sell market order) are linear
transformation that can easily and explicitly be written.
Therefore, an equation satisfied by the probability dis-
tribution P of the vector X of price changes can be ob-
tained. Finally, assuming further simplifications (such as
ρ+ = ρ−), one can solve this equation for a tail exponent
and find that the distribution behaves as P (x) ≈ x−2 for
large x. This analytical result is slightly different from
the one obtained by simulation in Maslov (2000). How-
ever, the numerous approximations make the comparison
difficult. The main point here is that some sort of mean-
field approximation is natural if we assume the existence
of a stationary state of the order book, and thus may
help handling order book models.
Smith et al. (2003) also propose some sort of mean-field
approximation for zero-intelligence models. In a similar
model (but including a cancellation process), mean field
theory and dimensional analysis produces interesting re-
sults. For example, it is easy to see that the book depth
(i.e. number of orders) Ne(p) at a price p far away from
the best quotes is given by Ne(p) = λ/δ, where λ is the
rate of arrival of limit orders per unit of time and per
unit of price, and δ the probability for an order to be
cancelled per unit of time. Indeed, far from the best
quotes no market orders occurs, so that if a steady-state
exists, the number of limit orders par time step λ must
be balanced by the number of cancellation δNe(p) per
unit of time, hence the result.
2. Explicit computation of probabilities conditionally on
the state of the order book
Cont et al. (2008) is an original attempt at analyt-
ical treatments of limit order books. In their model,
the price is contrained to be on a grid {1, . . . , N}. The
state of the order book can then be described by a vec-
tor X(t) = (X1(t), . . . , XN (t)) where |Xi(t)| is the quan-
tity offered in the order book at price i. Conventionaly,
Xi(t), i = 1, . . . , N is positive on the ask side and neg-
ative on the bid side. As usual, limit orders arrive at
level i at a constant rate λi, and market orders arrive
at a constant rate µ. Finally, at level i, each order can
be cancelled at a rate θi. Using this setting, Cont et al.
(2008) show that each event (limit order, market order,
cancellation) transforms the vector X in a simple linear
way. Therefore, it is shown that under reasonable con-
ditions, X is an ergodic Markov chain, and thus admits
a stationary state. The original idea is then to use this
formalism to compute conditional probabilities on the
processes. More precisely, it is shown that using Laplace
transform, one may explicitly compute the probability of
an increase of the mid price conditionally on the current
state of the order book.
This original contribution could allow explicit evalu-
ation of strategies and open new perspectives in high-
frequency trading. However, it is based on a simple
model that does not reproduce empirical observations
such as volatility clustering. Complex models trying to
include market interactions will not fit into these analyt-
ical frameworks. We review some of these models in the
next section.
F. Towards non-trivial behaviours: modelling market
interactions
In all the models we have reviewed until now, flows of
orders are treated as independent processes. Under some
(strong) modelling constraints, we can see the order book
as a Markov chain and look for analytical results (Cont
et al. (2008)). In any case, even if the process is empiri-
cally detailed and not trivial (Mike and Farmer (2008)),
we work with the assumption that orders are indepen-
dent and identically distributed. This very strong (and
false) hypothesis is similar to the “representative agent”
hypothesis in Economics: orders being successively and
independently submitted, we may not expect anything
but regular behaviours. Following the work of economists
such as Kirman (1992, 1993, 2002), one has to trans-
late the heterogeneous property of the markets into the
agent-based models. Agents are not identical, and not
independent.
In this section we present some toy models imple-
menting mechanisms that aim at bringing heterogeneity:
herding behaviour on markets in Cont and Bouchaud
(2000), trend following behaviour in Lux and Marchesi
(2000) or in Preis et al. (2007), threshold behaviour Cont
(2007). Most of the models reviewed in this section are
not order book models, since a persistent order book is
not kept during the simulations. They are rather price
models, where the price changes are determined by the
aggregation of excess supply and demand. However, they
identify essential mechanisms that may clearly explain
some empirical data. Incorporating these mechanisms in
an order book model is not yet achieved but is certainly
a future prospective.
1. Herding behaviour
The model presented in Cont and Bouchaud (2000)
considers a market with N agents trading a given stock
with price p(t). At each time step, agents choose to
buy or sell one unit of stock, i.e. their demand is
φi(t) = ±1, i = 1, . . . , N with probability a or are idle
with probability 1−2a. The price change is assumed to be
linearly linked with the excess demandD(t) =
∑N
i=1 φi(t)
with a factor λ measuring the liquidity of the market :
p(t+ 1) = p(t) +
1
λ
N∑
i=1
φi(t). (7)
9λ can also be interpreted as a market depth, i.e. the ex-
cess demand needed to move the price by one unit. In
order to evaluate the distribution of stock returns from
Eq.(7), we need to know the joint distribution of the in-
dividual demands (φi(t))1≤i≤N . As pointed out by the
authors, if the distribution of the demand φi is indepen-
dent and identically distributed with finite variance, then
the Central Limit Theorem stands and the distribution
of the price variation ∆p(t) = p(t+1)−p(t) will converge
to a Gaussian distribution as N goes to infinity.
The idea here is to model the diffusion of the informa-
tion among traders by randomly linking their demand
through clusters. At each time step, agents i and j can
be linked with probability pij = p =
c
N , c being a param-
eter measuring the degree of clustering among agents.
Therefore, an agent is linked to an average number of
(N − 1)p other traders. Once clusters are determined,
the demand are forced to be identical among all members
of a given cluster. Denoting nc(t) the number of cluster
at a given time step t, Wk the size of the k-th cluster,
k = 1, . . . , nc(t) and φk = ±1 its investement decision,
the price variation is then straightforwardly written :
∆p(t) =
1
λ
nc(t)∑
k=1
Wkφk. (8)
This modelling is a direct application to the field of fi-
nance of the random graph framework as studied in Erdos
and Renyi (1960). Kirman (1983) previously suggested
it in economics. Using these previous theoretical works,
and assuming that the size of a cluster Wk and the de-
cision taken by its members φk(t) are independent, the
author are able to show that the distribution of the price
variation at time t is the sum of nc(t) independent identi-
cally distributed random variables with heavy-tailed dis-
tributions :
∆p(t) =
1
λ
nc(t)∑
k=1
Xk, (9)
where the density f(x) of Xk =Wkφk is decaying as :
f(x) ∼|x|→∞ A|x|5/2 e
−(c−1)|x|
W0 . (10)
Thus, this simple toy model exhibits fat tails in the dis-
tribution of prices variations, with a decay reasonably
close to empirical data. Therefore, Cont and Bouchaud
(2000) show that taking into account a naive mechanism
of communication between agents (herding behaviour) is
able to drive the model out of the Gaussian convergence
and produce non-trivial shapes of distributions of price
returns.
2. Fundamentalists and trend followers
Lux and Marchesi (2000) proposed a model very much
in line with agent-based models in behavioural finance,
but where trading rules are kept simple enough so that
they can be identified with a presumably realistic be-
haviour of agents. This model considers a market with N
agents that can be part of two distinct groups of traders:
nf traders are “fundamentalists”, who share an exoge-
nous idea pf of the value of the current price p; and nc
traders are “chartists” (or trend followers), who make as-
sumptions on the price evolution based on the observed
trend (mobile average). The total number of agents is
constant, so that nf +nc = N at any time. At each time
step, the price can be moved up or down with a fixed
jump size of ±0.01 (a tick). The probability to go up or
down is directly linked to the excess demand ED through
a coefficient β. The demand of each group of agents is
determined as follows :
• Each fundamentalist trades a volume Vf propor-
tional, with a coefficient γ, to the deviation of
the current price p from the perceived fundamental
value pf : Vf = γ(pf − p).
• Each chartist trades a constant volume Vc. Denot-
ing n+ the number of optimistic (buyer) chartists
and n− the number of pessimistic (seller) chartists,
the excess demand by the whole group of chartists
is written (n+ − n−)Vc.
Therefore, assuming that there exists some noise traders
on the market with random demand µ, the global excess
demand is written :
ED = (n+ − n−)Vc + nfγ(pf − p) + µ. (11)
The probability that the price goes up (resp. down) is
then defined to be the positive (resp. negative) part of
βED.
As observed in Wyart and Bouchaud (2007), funda-
mentalists are expected to stabilize the market, while
chartists should destabilize it. In addition, following
Cont and Bouchaud (2000), the authors expect non-
trivial features of the price series to results from herding
behaviour and transitions between groups of traders. Re-
ferring to Kirman’s work as well, a mimicking behaviour
among chartists is thus proposed. The nc chartists can
change their view on the market (optimistic, pessimistic),
their decision being based on a clustering process mod-
elled by an opinion index x = n+−n−nc representing the
weight of the majority. The probabilities pi+ and pi− to
switch from one group to another are formally written :
pi± = v
nc
N
e±U , U = α1x+ α2p/v, (12)
where v is a constant, and α1 and α2 reflect respectively
the weight of the majority’s opinion and the weight of
the observed price in the chartists’ decision. Transitions
between fundamentalists and chartists are also allowed,
decided by comparison of expected returns (see Lux and
Marchesi (2000) for details).
The authors show that the distribution of returns gen-
erated by their model have excess kurtosis. Using a
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Hill estimator, they fit a power law to the fat tails of
the distribution and observe exponents grossly ranging
from 1.9 to 4.6. They also check hints for volatility clus-
tering: absolute returns and squared returns exhibit a
slow decay of autocorrelation, while raw returns do not.
It thus appears that such a model can grossly fit some
“stylized facts”. However, the number of parameters in-
volved, as well as the complicated rules of transition be-
tween agents, make clear identification of sources of phe-
nomenons and calibration to market data difficult and
intractable.
Alfi et al. (2009a,b) provide a somewhat simplifying
view on the Lux-Marchesi model. They clearly identify
the fundamentalist behaviour, the chartist behaviour, the
herding effect and the observation of the price by the
agents as four essential effects of an agent-based finan-
cial model. They show that the number of agents plays
a crucial role in a Lux-Marchesi-type model: more pre-
cisely, the stylized facts are reproduced only with a finite
number of agents, not when the number of agents grows
asymptotically, in which case the model stays in a fun-
damentalist regime. There is a finite-size effect that may
prove important for further studies.
The role of the trend following mechanism in producing
non-trivial features in price time series is also studied in
Preis et al. (2007). The starting point is an order book
model similar to Challet and Stinchcombe (2001) and
Smith et al. (2003): at each time step, liquidity providers
submit limit orders at rate λ and liquidity takers sub-
mit market orders at rate µ. As expected, this zero-
intelligence framework does not produce fat tails in the
distribution of (log-)returns nor an over-diffusive Hurst
exponent. Then, a stochastic link between order place-
ment and market trend is added: it is assumed that liq-
uidity providers observing a trend in the market will act
consequently and submit limit orders at a wider depth in
the order book. Although the assumption behind such
a mechanism may not be empirically confirmed (a ques-
tionable symmetry in order placement is assumed) and
should be further discussed, it is interesting enough that
it directly provides fat tails in the log-return distribu-
tions and an over-diffusive Hurst exponent H ≈ 0.6− 0.7
for medium time-scales, as shown in figure 7.
3. Threshold behaviour
We finally review a model focusing primarily on repro-
ducing the stylized fact of volatility clustering, while most
of the previous models we have reviewed were mostly fo-
cused on fat tails of log returns. Cont (2007) proposes a
model with a rather simple mechanism to create volatil-
ity clustering. The idea is that volatility clustering char-
acterizes several regimes of volatility (quite periods vs
bursts of activity). Instead of implementing an exoge-
nous change of regime, the author defines the following
trading rules.
At each period, an agent i ∈ {1, . . . , N} can issue a buy
FIG. 7. Hurst exponent found in the Preis model for different
number of agents when including random demand perturba-
tion and dynamic limit order placement depth. Reproduced
from Preis et al. (2007).
or a sell order: φi(t) = ±1. Information is represented
by a series of i.i.d Gaussian random variables. (t). This
public information t is a forecast for the value rt+1 of
the return of the stock. Each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , N} de-
cides whether to follow this information according to a
threshold θi > 0 representing its sensibility to the public
information:
φi(t) =

1 if i(t) > θi(t)
0 if |i(t)| < θi(t)
−1 if i(t) < −θi(t)
(13)
Then, once every choice is made, the price evolves accord-
ing to the excess demand D(t) =
∑N
i=1 φi(t), in a way
similar to Cont and Bouchaud (2000). At the end of each
time step t, threshold are asynchronously updated. Each
agent has a probability s to update its threshold θi(t).
In such a case, the new threshold θi(t + 1) is defined to
be the absolute value |rt|of the return just observed. In
short:
θi(t+ 1) = 1{ui(t)<s}|rt|+ 1{ui(t)>s}θi(t). (14)
The author shows that the time series simulated with
such a model do exhibit some realistic facts on volatility.
In particular, long range correlations of absolute returns
is observed. The strength of this model is that it di-
rectly links the state of the market with the decision of
the trader. Such a feedback mechanism is essential in
order to obtain non trivial characteristics. Of course, the
model presented in Cont (2007) is too simple to be fully
calibrated on empirical data, but its mechanism could be
used in a more elaborate agent-based model in order to
reproduce the empirical evidence of volatility clustering.
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G. Remarks
Let us attempt to make some concluding remarks
on these developments of agent-based models for order
books. In table III, we summarize some key features of
some of the order book models reviewed in this section.
Among important elements for future modelling, we may
mention the cancellation of orders, which is the less real-
istic mechanism implemented in existing models ; the or-
der book stability, which is always exogenously enforced
(see our review of Mike and Farmer (2008) above) ; and
the dependence between order flows (see e.g. Muni Toke
(2010) and reference therein). Empirical estimation of
these mechanisms is still challenging.
Emphasis has been put in this section on order book
modelling, a field that is at the crossroad of many larger
disciplines (market microstructure, behavioural finance
and physics). Market microstructure is essential since
it defines in many ways the goal of the modelling. We
pointed out that it is not a coincidence if the work by
Garman (1976) was published when computerization of
exchanges was about to make the electronic order book
the key of all trading. Regulatory issues that pushed
early studies are still very important today. Realistic
order book models could be a invaluable tool in testing
and evaluating the effects of regulations such as the 2005
Regulation NMS3 in the USA, or the 2007 MiFID4 in
Europe.
III. AGENT-BASED MODELLING FOR WEALTH
DISTRIBUTIONS: KINETIC THEORY MODELS
The distributions of money, wealth or income, i.e., how
such quantities are shared among the population of a
given country and among different countries, is a topic
which has been studied by economists for a long time.
The relevance of the topic to us is twofold: From the
point of view of the science of Complex Systems, wealth
distributions represent a unique example of a quantita-
tive outcome of a collective behavior which can be di-
rectly compared with the predictions of theoretical mod-
els and numerical experiments. Also, there is a basic
interest in wealth distributions from the social point of
view, in particular in their degree of (in)equality. To this
aim, the Gini coefficient (or the Gini index, if expressed
as a percentage), developed by the Italian statistician
Corrado Gini, represents a concept commonly employed
to measure inequality of wealth distributions or, more
in general, how uneven a given distribution is. For a
cumulative distribution function F (y), that is piecewise
differentiable, has a finite mean µ, and is zero for y < 0,
3 National Market System
4 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
the Gini coefficient is defined as
G = 1− 1
µ
∫ ∞
0
dy (1 − F (y))2
=
1
µ
∫ ∞
0
dy F (y)(1 − F (y)) . (15)
It can also be interpreted statistically as half the relative
mean difference. Thus the Gini coefficient is a number
between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds with perfect equal-
ity (where everyone has the same income) and 1 corre-
sponds with perfect inequality (where one person has all
the income, and everyone else has zero income). Some
values of G for some countries are listed in Table IV.
Let us start by considering the basic economic quanti-
ties: money, wealth and income.
A. Money, wealth and income
A common definition of money suggests that money is
the “[c]ommodity accepted by general consent as medium
of economics exchange”5. In fact, money circulates from
one economic agent (which can represent an individual,
firm, country, etc.) to another, thus facilitating trade. It
is “something which all other goods or services are traded
for” (for details see Shostak (2000)). Throughout history
various commodities have been used as money, for these
cases termed as “commodity money”, which include for
example rare seashells or beads, and cattle (such as cow
in India). Recently, “commodity money” has been re-
placed by other forms referred to as “fiat money”, which
have gradually become the most common ones, such as
metal coins and paper notes. Nowadays, other forms of
money, such as electronic money, have become the most
frequent form used to carry out transactions. In any case
the most relevant points about money employed are its
basic functions, which according to standard economic
theory are
• to serve as a medium of exchange, which is univer-
sally accepted in trade for goods and services;
• to act as a measure of value, making possible the
determination of the prices and the calculation of
costs, or profit and loss;
• to serve as a standard of deferred payments, i.e., a
tool for the payment of debt or the unit in which
loans are made and future transactions are fixed;
• to serve as a means of storing wealth not immedi-
ately required for use.
5 In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved June 17, 2010, from En-
cyclopædia Britannica Online
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Model Stigler (1961) Garman (1976) Bak, Paczuski
and Shubik
(1997)
Maslov (2000) Challet and
Stinchcombe
(2001)
Mike and Farmer
(2008)
Price
range
Finite grid Finite grid Finite grid Unconstrained Unconstrained Unconstrained
Clock Trade time Physical Time Aggregated time Event time Aggregated time Aggregated time
Flows /
Agents
One zero-
intelligence agent
/ One flow
One zero-
intelligence
agent / Two flows
(buy/sell)
N agents owning
each one limit or-
der
One zero-
intelligence flow
(limit order with
fixed probability,
else market order)
One zero-
intelligence agent
/ One flow
One zero-
intelligence agent
/ One flow
Limit
orders
Uniform distribu-
tion on the price
grid
Two Poisson pro-
cesses for buy and
sell orders
Moving at each
time step by one
tick
Uniformly dis-
tributed in a
finite interval
around last price
Normally dis-
tributed around
best quote
Student-
distributed
around best
quote
Market
orders
Defined as cross-
ing limit orders
Defined as cross-
ing limit orders
Defined as cross-
ing limit orders
Submitted as such Defined as cross-
ing limit orders
Defined as cross-
ing limit orders
Cancel-
lation
orders
Pending orders
are cancelled after
a fixed number of
time steps
None None (constant
number of pend-
ing orders)
Pending orders
are cancelled after
a fixed number of
time steps
Pending orders
can be cancelled
with fixed prob-
ability at each
time step
Pending orders
can be cancelled
with 3-parameter
conditional prob-
ability at each
time step
Volume Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit
Order
signs
Independent Independent Independent Independent Independent Correlated with a
fractional Brown-
ian motion
Claimed
results
Return distribu-
tion is power-law
0.3 / Cut-off be-
cause finite grid
Microstructure
is responsible
for negative
correlation of
consecutive price
changes
No fat tails for re-
turns / Hurst ex-
ponent 1/4 for
price increments
Fat tails for distri-
butions of returns
/ Hurst exponent
1/4
Hurst exponent
1/4 for short time
scales, tending
to 1/2 for larger
time scales
Fat tails distribu-
tions of returns
/ Realistic spread
distribution / Un-
stable order book
TABLE III. Summary of the characteristics of the reviewed limit order book models.
A related feature relevant for the present investigation is
that money is the medium in which prices or values of all
commodities as well as costs, profits, and transactions
can be determined or expressed. Wealth is usually un-
derstood as things that have economic utility (monetary
value or value of exchange), or material goods or prop-
erty; it also represents the abundance of objects of value
(or riches) and the state of having accumulated these ob-
jects; for our purpose, it is important to bear in mind
that wealth can be measured in terms of money. Also
income, defined in Case and Fair (2008) as “the sum of
all the wages, salaries, profits, interests payments, rents
and other forms of earnings received... in a given period
of time”, is a quantity which can be measured in terms
of money (per unit time).
B. Modelling wealth distributions
It was first observed by Pareto (1897) that in an econ-
omy the higher end of the distribution of income f(x)
follows a power-law,
f(x) ∼ x−1−α , (16)
with α, now known as the Pareto exponent, estimated by
him to be α ≈ 3/2. For the last hundred years the value
of α ∼ 3/2 seems to have changed little in time and
across the various capitalist economies (see Yakovenko
and Rosser (2009) and references therein).
Gibrat (1931) clarified that Pareto’s law is valid only
for the high income range, whereas for the middle in-
come range he suggested that the income distribution is
described by a log-normal probability density
f(x) ∼ 1
x
√
2piσ2
exp
{
− log
2(x/x0)
2σ2
}
, (17)
where log(x0) = 〈log(x)〉 is the mean value of the loga-
rithmic variable and σ2 = 〈[log(x) − log(x0)]2〉 the cor-
responding variance. The factor β = 1/
√
2σ2, also know
an as Gibrat index, measures the equality of the distri-
bution.
More recent empirical studies on income distribution
have been carried out by physicists, e.g. those by Drag-
ulescu and Yakovenko (2001b,a) for UK and US, by Fu-
jiwara et al. (2003) for Japan, and by Nirei and Souma
(2007) for US and Japan. For an overview see Yakovenko
and Rosser (2009). The distributions obtained have been
shown to follow either the log-normal (Gamma like) or
power-law types, depending on the range of wealth, as
shown in Fig. 8.
One of the current challenges is to write down the “mi-
croscopic equation” which governs the dynamics of the
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TABLE IV. Gini indices (in percent) of some countries
(from Human Development Indicators of the United Na-
tions Human Development Report 2004, pp.50-53, available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2004. More
recent data are also available from their website.)
Denmark 24.7
Japan 24.9
Sweden 25.0
Norway 25.8
Germany 28.3
India 32.5
France 32.7
Australia 35.2
UK 36.0
USA 40.8
Hong Kong 43.4
China 44.7
Russia 45.6
Mexico 54.6
Chile 57.1
Brazil 59.1
South Africa 59.3
Botswana 63.0
Namibia 70.7
FIG. 8. Income distributions in the US (left)and Japan
(right). Reproduced and adapted from Chakrabarti and
Chatterjee (2003), available at arXiv:cond-mat/0302147.
evolution of wealth distributions, possibly predicting the
observed shape of wealth distributions, including the ex-
ponential law at intermediate values of wealth as well as
the century-old Pareto law. To this aim, several studies
have been made to investigate the characteristics of the
real income distribution and provide theoretical models
or explanations (see e.g. reviews by Lux (2005), Chat-
terjee and Chakrabarti (2007), Yakovenko and Rosser
(2009)).
The model of Gibrat (1931) and other models for-
mulated in terms of a Langevin equation for a sin-
gle wealth variable, subjected to multiplicative noise
(Mandelbrot (1960); Levy and Solomon (1996); Sornette
(1998); Burda et al. (2003)), can lead to equilibrium
wealth distributions with a power law tail, since they
converge toward a log-normal distribution. However, the
fit of real wealth distributions does not turn out to be as
good as that obtained using e.g. a Γ- or a β-distribution,
in particular due to too large asymptotic variances (An-
gle (1986)). Other models use a different approach and
describe the wealth dynamics as a wealth flow due to ex-
changes between (pairs of) basic units. In this respect,
such models are basically different from the class of mod-
els formulated in terms of a Langevin equation for a single
wealth variable. For example, Solomon and Levy (1996)
studied the generalized Lotka-Volterra equations in rela-
tion to power-law wealth distribution. Ispolatov et al.
(1998) studied random exchange models of wealth distri-
butions. Other models describing wealth exchange have
been formulated using matrix theory (Gupta (2006)), the
master equation (Bouchaud and Mezard (2000); Drag-
ulescu and Yakovenko (2000); Ferrero (2004)), the Boltz-
mann equation approach (Dragulescu and Yakovenko
(2000); Slanina (2004); Repetowicz et al. (2005); Cordier
et al. (2005); Matthes and Toscani (2007); Du¨ring and
Toscani (2007); Du¨ring et al. (2008)), or Markov chains
(Scalas et al. (2006, 2007); Garibaldi et al. (2007)). It
should be mentioned that one of the earliest modelling
efforts were made by Champernowne (1953). Since then
many economists, Gabaix (1999) and Benhabib and Bisin
(2009) amongst others, have also studied mechanisms for
power laws, and distributions of wealth.
In the two following sections we consider in greater
detail a class of models usually referred to as kinetic
wealth exchange models (KWEM), formulated through
finite time difference stochastic equations (Angle (1986,
2002, 2006); Chakraborti and Chakrabarti (2000); Drag-
ulescu and Yakovenko (2000); Chakraborti (2002); Hayes
(2002); Chatterjee et al. (2003); Das and Yarlagadda
(2003); Scafetta et al. (2004); Iglesias et al. (2003, 2004);
Ausloos and Pekalski (2007)). From the studies carried
out using wealth-exchange models, it emerges that it is
possible to use them to generate power law distributions.
C. Homogeneous kinetic wealth exchange models
Here and in the next section we consider KWEMs,
which are statistical models of closed economy. Their
goal, rather then describing the market dynamics in
terms of intelligent agents, is to predict the time evo-
lution of the distribution of some main quantity, such
as wealth, by studying the corresponding flow process
among individuals. The underlying idea is that however
complicated the detailed rules of wealth exchanges can
be, their average behaviour can be described in a rel-
atively more simple way and will share some universal
properties with other transport processes, due to general
14
conservation constraints and the effect of the fluctuations
due to the environment or associated to the individual be-
haviour. In this, there is a clear analogy with the general
theory of transport phenomena (e.g. of energy).
In these models the states of agents are defined in terms
of the wealth variables {xn}, n = 1, 2, . . . , N . The evo-
lution of the system is carried out according to a trading
rule between agents which, for obtaining the final equilib-
rium distribution, can be interpreted as the actual time
evolution of the agent states as well as a Monte Carlo
optimization. The algorithm is based on a simple update
rule performed at each time step t, when two agents i
and j are extracted randomly and an amount of wealth
∆x is exchanged,
x′i = xi −∆x ,
x′j = xj +∆x . (18)
Notice that the quantity x is conserved during single
transactions, x′i + x
′
j = xi + xj , where xi = xi(t)
and xj = xj(t) are the agent wealth before, whereas
x′i = xi(t + 1) and x
′
j = xj(t + 1) are the final ones
after the transaction. Several rules have been studied
for the model defined by Eqs. (18). It is noteworthy,
that though this theory has been originally derived from
the entropy maximization principle of statistical mechan-
ics, it has recently been shown that the same could be
derived from the utility maximization principle as well,
following a standard exchange-model with Cobb-Douglas
utility function (as explained later), which bridge physics
and economics together.
1. Exchange models without saving
In a simple version of KWEM considered in the works
by Bennati (1988a,b, 1993) and also studied by Drag-
ulescu and Yakovenko (2000) the money difference ∆x in
Eqs. (18) is assumed to have a constant value, ∆x = ∆x0.
Together with the constraint that transactions can take
place only if x′i > 0 and x
′
j > 0, this leads to an equilib-
rium exponential distribution, see the curve for λ = 0 in
Fig. 9.
Various other trading rules were studied by Drag-
ulescu and Yakovenko (2000), choosing ∆x as a random
fraction of the average money between the two agents,
∆x = (xi+xj)/2, corresponding to a ∆x = (1−)xi−xj
in (18), or of the average money of the whole system,
∆x = 〈x〉.
The models mentioned, as well as more complicated
ones (Dragulescu and Yakovenko (2000)), lead to an equi-
librium wealth distribution with an exponential tail
f(x) ∼ β exp(−βx) , (19)
with the effective temperature 1/β of the order of the
average wealth, β−1 = 〈x〉. This result is largely inde-
pendent of the details of the models, e.g. the multi-agent
nature of the interaction, the initial conditions, and the
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FIG. 9. Probability density for wealth x. The curve for λ = 0
is the Boltzmann function f(x) = 〈x〉−1 exp(−x/〈x〉) for the
basic model of Sec. IIIC 1. The other curves correspond to a
global saving propensity λ > 0, see Sec. III C 2.
random or consecutive order of extraction of the interact-
ing agents. The Boltzmann distribution is characterized
by a majority of poor agents and a few rich agents (due
to the exponential tail), and has a Gini coefficient of 0.5.
2. Exchange models with saving
As a generalization and more realistic version of the
basic exchange models, a saving criterion can be intro-
duced. Angle (1983), motivated by the surplus theory,
introduced a unidirectional model of wealth exchange, in
which only a fraction of wealth smaller than one can pass
from one agent to the other, with a ∆x = xi or (−ωxj),
where the direction of the flow is determined by the agent
wealth (Angle (1983, 1986)). Later Angle introduced the
One-Parameter Inequality Process (OPIP) where a con-
stant fraction 1−ω is saved before the transaction (Angle
(2002)) by the agent whose wealth decreases, defined by
an exchanged wealth amount ∆x = ωxi or −ωxj , again
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with the direction of the transaction determined by the
relative difference between the agent wealth.
A “saving parameter” 0 < λ < 1 representing the frac-
tion of wealth saved, was introduced in the model by
Chakraborti and Chakrabarti (2000). In this model (CC)
wealth flows simultaneously toward and from each agent
during a single transaction, the dynamics being defined
by the equations
x′i = λxi + (1− λ)(xi + xj) ,
x′j = λxj + (1− )(1 − λ)(xi + xj) , (20)
or, equivalently, by a ∆x in (18) given by
∆x = (1 − λ)[(1 − )xi − xj ] . (21)
These models, apart from the OPIP model of An-
gle which has the remarkable property of leading to a
power law in a suitable range of ω, can be well fit-
ted by a Γ-distribution. The Γ-distribution is charac-
terized by a mode xm > 0, in agreement with real
data of wealth and income distributions (Dragulescu and
Yakovenko (2001a); Ferrero (2004); Silva and Yakovenko
(2005); Sala-i Martin and Mohapatra (2002); Sala-i Mar-
tin (2002); Aoyama et al. (2003)). Furthermore, the limit
for small x is zero, i.e. P (x→ 0)→ 0, see the example in
Fig. 9. In the particular case of the model by Chakraborti
and Chakrabarti (2000), the explicit distribution is well
fitted by
f(x) = n〈x〉−1γn(nx/〈x〉)
=
1
Γ(n)
n
〈x〉
(
nx
〈x〉
)n−1
exp
(
− nx〈x〉
)
, (22)
n(λ) ≡ Dλ
2
= 1 +
3λ
1− λ . (23)
where γn(ξ) is the standard Γ-distribution. This partic-
ular functional form has been conjectured on the base of
the excellent fitting provided to numerical data (Angle
(1983, 1986); Patriarca et al. (2004b,a); Patriarca and
Heinsalu (2009)). For more information and a compar-
ison of similar fittings for different models see Patriarca
et al. (2010). Very recently, Lallouache et al. (2010) have
shown using the distributional form of the equation and
moment calculations that strictly speaking the Gamma
distribution is not the solution of Eq. (20), confirming the
earlier results of Repetowicz et al. (2005). However, the
Gamma distribution is a very very good approximation.
The ubiquitous presence of Γ-functions in the solutions
of kinetic models (see also below heterogeneous models)
suggests a close analogy with kinetic theory of gases. In
fact, interpreting Dλ = 2n as an effective dimension,
the variable x as kinetic energy, and introducing the ef-
fective temperature β−1 ≡ Tλ = 〈x〉/2Dλ according to
the equipartition theorem, Eqs. (22) and (23) define the
canonical distribution βγn(βx) for the kinetic energy of
a gas in Dλ = 2n dimensions, see Patriarca et al. (2004a)
for details. The analogy is illustrated in Table V and the
dependences of Dλ = 2n and of β
−1 = Tλ on the saving
parameter λ are shown in Fig. 10.
 1
 10
 100
 0.01  0.1  1
D
λ
λ
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
T λ
/〈 x
 〉
λ
FIG. 10. Effective dimension Dλ and temperature T as a
function of the saving parameter λ.
TABLE V. Analogy between kinetic the theory of gases and
the kinetic exchange model of wealth
Kinetic model Economy model
variable K (kinetic energy) x (wealth)
units N particles N agents
interaction collisions trades
dimension integer D real number Dλ
temperature definition kBT = 2〈K〉/D Tλ = 2〈x〉/Dλ
reduced variable ξ = K/kBT ξ = x/Tλ
equilibrium distribution f(ξ) = γD/2(ξ) f(ξ) = γDλ/2(ξ)
The exponential distribution is recovered as a special
case, for n = 1. In the limit λ → 1, i.e. for n → ∞,
the distribution f(x) above tends to a Dirac δ-function,
as shown in Patriarca et al. (2004a) and qualitatively
illustrated by the curves in Fig. 9. This shows that a large
saving criterion leads to a final state in which economic
agents tend to have similar amounts of money and, in
the limit of λ→ 1, exactly the same amount 〈x〉.
The equivalence between a kinetic wealth-exchange
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model with saving propensity λ ≥ 0 and an N -particle
system in a space with dimension Dλ ≥ 2 is suggested by
simple considerations about the kinetics of collision pro-
cesses between two molecules. In one dimension, particles
undergo head-on collisions in which the whole amount of
kinetic energy can be exchanged. In a larger number of
dimensions the two particles will not travel in general ex-
actly along the same line, in opposite verses, and only a
fraction of the energy can be exchanged. It can be shown
that during a binary elastic collision inD dimensions only
a fraction 1/D of the total kinetic energy is exchanged
on average for kinematic reasons, see Chakraborti and
Patriarca (2008) for details. The same 1/D dependence
is in fact obtained inverting Eq. (23), which provides for
the fraction of exchanged wealth 1− λ = 6/(Dλ + 4).
Not all homogeneous models lead to distributions with
an exponential tail. For instance, in the model studied in
Chakraborti (2002) an agent i can lose all his wealth, thus
becoming unable to trade again: after a sufficient number
of transactions, only one trader survives in the market
and owns the entire wealth. The equilibrium distribution
has a very different shape, as explained below:
In the toy model it is assumed that both the economic
agents i and j invest the same amount xmin, which is
taken as the minimum wealth between the two agents,
xmin = min{xi, xj}. The wealth after the trade are x′i =
xi + ∆x and x
′
j = xj − ∆x, where ∆x = (2 − 1)xmin.
We note that once an agent has lost all his wealth, he
is unable to trade because xmin has become zero. Thus,
a trader is effectively driven out of the market once he
loses all his wealth. In this way, after a sufficient number
of transactions only one trader survives in the market
with the entire amount of wealth, whereas the rest of the
traders have zero wealth. In this toy model, only one
agent has the entire money of the market and the rest
of the traders have zero money, which corresponds to a
distribution with Gini coefficient equal to unity.
Now, a situation is said to be Pareto-optimal “if by
reallocation you cannot make someone better off without
making someone else worse off”. In Pareto’s own words:
“We will say that the members of a collectiv-
ity enjoy maximum ophelimity in a certain
position when it is impossible to find a way
of moving from that position very slightly in
such a manner that the ophelimity enjoyed
by each of the individuals of that collectiv-
ity increases or decreases. That is to say, any
small displacement in departing from that po-
sition necessarily has the effect of increasing
the ophelimity which certain individuals en-
joy, and decreasing that which others enjoy,
of being agreeable to some, and disagreeable
to others.”
— Vilfredo Pareto, Manual of Political Econ-
omy (1906), p.261.
However, as Sen (1971) notes, an economy can be Pareto-
optimal, yet still “perfectly disgusting” by any ethi-
FIG. 11. Results for randomly assigned saving parameters.
Reproduced and adapted from Chakrabarti and Chatterjee
(2003), available at arXiv:cond-mat/0302147.
cal standards . It is important to note that Pareto-
optimality, is merely a descriptive term, a property of an
“allocation”, and there are no ethical propositions about
the desirability of such allocations inherent within that
notion. Thus, in other words there is nothing inherent in
Pareto-optimality that implies the maximization of social
welfare.
This simple toy model thus also produces a Pareto-
optimal state (it will be impossible to raise the well-being
of anyone except the winner, i.e., the agent with all the
money, and vice versa ) but the situation is economically
undesirable as far as social welfare is concerned!
Note also, as mentioned above, the OPIP model of
Angle (2006, 2002), for example, depending on the model
parameters, can also produce a power law tail. Another
general way to produce a power law tail in the equilibrium
distribution seems to diversify the agents, i.e. to consider
heterogeneous models, discussed below.
D. Heterogeneous kinetic wealth exchange models
1. Random saving propensities
The models considered above assume the all agents
have the same statistical properties. The corresponding
equilibrium wealth distribution has in most of the cases
an exponential tail, a form which well interpolates real
data at small and intermediate values of wealth. How-
ever, it is possible to conceive generalized models which
lead to even more realistic equilibrium wealth distribu-
tions. This is the case when agents are diversified by
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assigning different values of the saving parameter. For
instance, Angle (2002) studied a model with a trading
rule where diversified parameters {ωi} occur,
∆x = ωixi or − ωjxj , (24)
with the direction of wealth flow determined by the
wealth of agents i and j. Diversified saving parame-
ters were independently introduced by Chatterjee et al.
(2003, 2004) by generalizing the model introduced in
Chakraborti and Chakrabarti (2000):
x′i = λixi + [(1− λi)xi + (1− λj)xj ] ,
x′j = λxj + (1− )[(1 − λi)xi + (1 − λj)xj ] , (25)
corresponding to a
∆x = (1− )(1 − λi)xi − (1− λj)xj . (26)
The surprising result is that if the parameters {λi} are
suitably diversified, a power law appears in the equilib-
rium wealth distribution, see Fig. 11. In particular if the
λi are uniformly distributed in (0, 1) the wealth distribu-
tion exhibits a robust power-law tail,
f(x) ∝ x−α−1 , (27)
with the Pareto exponent α = 1 largely independent of
the details of the λ-distribution. It may be noted that
the exponent value unity is strictly for the tail end of
the distribution and not for small values of the income
or wealth (where the distribution remains exponential).
Also, for finite number N of agents, there is always an
exponential (in N) cut off at the tail end of the distribu-
tion. This result is supported by independent theoretical
considerations based on different approaches, such as a
mean field theory approach (Mohanty (2006), see below
for further details) or the Boltzmann equation (Das and
Yarlagadda (2003, 2005); Repetowicz et al. (2005); Chat-
terjee et al. (2005a)). For derivation of the Pareto law
from variational principles, using the KWEM context,
see Chakraborti and Patriarca (2009).
2. Power-law distribution as an overlap of Gamma
distributions
A remarkable feature of the equilibrium wealth dis-
tribution obtained from heterogeneous models, noticed
in Chatterjee et al. (2004), is that the individual wealth
distribution fi(x) of the generic i-th agent with saving pa-
rameter λi has a well defined mode and exponential tail,
in spite of the resulting power-law tail of the marginal
distribution f(x) =
∑
i fi(x). In fact, Patriarca et al.
(2005) found by numerical simulation that the marginal
distribution f(x) can be resolved as an overlap of individ-
ual Gamma distributions with λ-dependent parameters;
furthermore, the mode and the average value of the distri-
butions fi(x) both diverge for λ→ 1 as 〈x(λ)〉 ∼ 1/(1−λ)
(Chatterjee et al. (2004); Patriarca et al. (2005)). This
fact was justified theoretically by Mohanty (2006). Con-
sider the evolution equations (25). In the mean field ap-
proximation one can consider that each agents i has an
(average) wealth 〈xi〉 = yi and replace the random num-
ber  with its average value 〈〉 = 1/2. Indicating with
yij the new wealth of agent i, due to the interaction with
agent j, from Eqs. (25) one obtains
yij = (1/2)(1 + λi)yi + (1/2)(1− λj)yj . (28)
At equilibrium, for consistency, average over all the in-
teraction must give back yi,
yi =
∑
j
yij/N . (29)
Then summing Eq. (28) over j and dividing by the num-
ber of agents N , one has
(1− λi)yi = 〈(1− λ)y〉 , (30)
where 〈(1 − λ)y〉 = ∑j(1 − λj)yj/N . Since the right
hand side is independent of i and this relation holds for
arbitrary distributions of λi, the solution is
yi =
C
1− λi , (31)
where C is a constant. Besides proving the dependence
of yi = 〈xi〉 on λi, this relation also demonstrates the
existence of a power law tail in the equilibrium distribu-
tion. If, in the continuous limit, λ is distributed in (0, 1)
with a density φ(λ), (0 ≤ λ < 1), then using (31) the
(average) wealth distribution is given
f(y) = φ(λ)
dλ
dy
= φ(1 − C/x) C
y2
. (32)
Figure 12 illustrates the phenomenon for a system of
N = 1000 agents with random saving propensities uni-
formly distributed between 0 and 1. The figure confirms
the importance of agents with λ close to 1 for producing
a power-law probability distribution (Chatterjee et al.
(2004); Patriarca and Heinsalu (2009)).
However, when considering values of λ close enough to
1, the power law can break down at least for two reasons.
The first one, illustrated in Fig. 12-bottom right, is that
the power-law can be resolved into almost disjoint con-
tributions representing the wealth distributions of single
agents. This follows from the finite number of agents
used and the fact that the distance between the aver-
age values of the distributions corresponding to two con-
secutive values of λ grows faster than the corresponding
widths (Patriarca et al. (2005); Chatterjee et al. (2005b)).
The second reason is due to the finite cutoff λM, always
present in a numerical simulation. However, to study
this effect, one has to consider a system with a number
of agents large enough that it is not possible to resolve the
wealth distributions of single agents for the sub-intervals
of λ considered. This was done in by Patriarca et al.
(2006) using a system with N = 105 agents with sav-
ing parameters distributed uniformly between 0 and λM.
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FIG. 12. Wealth distribution in a system of 1000 agents
with saving propensities uniformly distributed in the inter-
val 0 < λ < 1. Top left: marginal distribution. Top right:
marginal distribution (dotted line) and distributions of wealth
of agents with λ ∈ (j∆λ, (j + 1)∆λ), ∆λ = 0.1, j = 0, . . . , 9
(continuous lines). Bottom-left: the distribution of wealth of
agents with λ ∈ (0.9, 1) has been further resolved into contri-
butions from subintervals λ ∈ (0.9 + j∆λ, 0.9 + (j + 1)∆λ),
∆λ = 0.01. Bottom-right: the partial distribution of wealth
of agents with λ ∈ (0.99, 1) has been further resolved into
those from subintervals λ ∈ (0.99 + j∆λ, 0.99 + (j + 1)∆λ),
∆λ = 0.001.
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FIG. 13. Wealth distribution obtained for the uniform saving
propensity distributions of 105 agents in the interval (0, λM).
Results are shown in Fig. 13, in which curves from left
to right correspond to increasing values of the cutoff λM
from 0.9 to 0.9997. The transition from an exponential
to a power-law tail takes place continuously as the cut-off
λM is increased beyond a critical value λM ≈ 0.9 toward
λM = 1, through the enlargement of the x-interval in
which the power-law is observed.
3. Relaxation process
Relaxation in systems with constant λ had already
been studied by Chakraborti and Chakrabarti (2000),
where a systematic increase of the relaxation time with
λ, and eventually a divergence for λ→ 1, was found. In
fact, for λ = 1 no exchanges occurs and the system is
frozen. The relaxation time scale of a heterogeneous
system had been studied by Patriarca et al. (2007). The
system is observed to relax toward the same equilibrium
wealth distribution from any given arbitrary initial dis-
tribution of wealth. If time is measured by the number of
transactions nt, the time scale is proportional to the num-
ber of agents N , i.e. defining time t as the ratio t = nt/N
between the number of trades and the total number of
agents N (corresponding to one Monte Carlo cycle or one
sweep in molecular dynamics simulations) the dynam-
ics and the relaxation process become independent of N .
The existence of a natural time scale independent of the
system size provides a foundation for using simulations
of systems with finite N in order to infer properties of
systems with continuous saving propensity distributions
and N →∞.
In a system with uniformly distributed λ, the wealth
distributions of each agent i with saving parameter λi
relaxes toward different states with characteristic shapes
fi(x) (Patriarca et al. (2005); Chatterjee et al. (2005b);
Patriarca et al. (2006)) with different relaxation times
τi (Patriarca et al. (2007)). The differences in the re-
laxation process can be related to the different relative
wealth exchange rates, that by direct inspection of the
evolution equations appear to be proportional to 1− λi.
Thus, in general, higher saving propensities are expected
to be associated to slower relaxation processes with a
relaxation time ∝ 1/(1− λ).
It is also possible to obtain the relaxation time distri-
bution. If the saving parameters are distributed in (0, 1)
with a density φ(λ), it follows from probability conser-
vation that f˜(x¯)dx¯ = φ(λ)dλ, where x¯ ≡ 〈x〉λ and f˜(x¯)
the corresponding density of average wealth values. In
the case of uniformly distributed saving propensities, one
obtains
f˜(x¯) = φ(λ)
dλ(x¯)
dx¯
= φ
(
1− k
x¯
)
k
x¯2
, (33)
showing that a uniform saving propensity distribution
leads to a power law f˜(x¯) ∼ 1/x¯2 in the (average) wealth
distribution. In a similar way it is possible to obtain the
associated distribution of relaxation times ψ(τ) for the
global relaxation process from the relation τi ∝ 1/(1−λi),
ψ(τ) = φ(λ)
dλ(τ)
dτ
∝ φ
(
1− τ
′
τ
)
τ ′
τ2
, (34)
where τ ′ is a proportionality factor. Therefore ψ(τ) and
f˜(x¯) are characterized by power law tails in τ and x¯ re-
spectively with the same Pareto exponent.
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In conclusion, the role of the λ-cut-off is also related to
the relaxation process. This means that the slowest con-
vergence rate is determined by the cut-off and is∝ 1−λM.
In numerical simulations of heterogeneous KWEMs, as
well as in real wealth distributions, the cut-off is necessar-
ily finite, so that the convergence is fast (Gupta (2008)).
On the other hand, if considering a hypothetical wealth
distribution with a power law extending to infinite values
of x, one cannot find a fast relaxation, due to the infinite
time scale of the system, due to the agents with λ = 1.
E. Microeconomic formulation of Kinetic theory models
Very recently, Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti (2009)
have studied the framework based on microeconomic the-
ory from which the kinetic theory market models could
be addressed. They derived the moments of the model
by Chakraborti and Chakrabarti (2000) and reproduced
the exchange equations used in the model (with fixed
savings parameter). In the framework considered, the
utility function deals with the behaviour of the agents in
an exchange economy.
They start by considering two exchange economy,
where each agent produces a single perishable commod-
ity. Each of these goods is different and money exists
in the economy to simply facilitate transactions. Each of
these agents are endowed with an initial amount of money
M1 = m1(t) and M2 = m2(t). Let agent 1 produce Q1
amount of commodity 1 only, and agent 2 produce Q2
amount of commodity 2 only. At each time step t, two
agents meet randomly to carry out transactions accord-
ing to their utility maximization principle.
The utility functions as defined as follows: For
agent 1, U1(x1, x2,m1) = x
α1
1 x
α2
2 m
αm
1 and for agent 2,
U2(y1, y2,m2) = y
α1
1 y
α2
2 m
αm
2 where the arguments in
both of the utility functions are consumption of the first
(i.e. x1 and y1) and second good (i.e. x2 and y2) and
amount of money in their possession respectively. For
simplicity, they assume that the utility functions are of
the above Cobb-Douglas form with the sum of the powers
normalized to 1 i.e. α1 + α2 + αm = 1.
Let the commodity prices to be determined in the mar-
ket be denoted by p1 and p2. Now, the budget con-
straints are as follows: For agent 1 the budget constraint
is p1x1+p2x2+m1 ≤M1+p1Q1 and similarly, for agent
2 the constraint is p1y1+ p2y2+m2 ≤M2+ p2Q2, which
mean that the amount that agent 1 can spend for con-
suming x1 and x2 added to the amount of money that he
holds after trading at time t+ 1 (i.e. m1) cannot exceed
the amount of money that he has at time t (i.e. M1)
added to what he earns by selling the good he produces
(i.e. Q1), and the same is true for agent 2.
Then the basic idea is that both of the agents try to
maximize their respective utility subject to their respec-
tive budget constraints and the invisible hand of the mar-
ket that is the price mechanism works to clear the market
for both goods (i.e. total demand equals total supply for
both goods at the equilibrium prices), which means that
agent 1’s problem is to maximize his utility subject to
his budget constraint i.e. maximize U1(x1, x2,m1) sub-
ject to p1.x1 + p2.x2 + m1 = M1 + p1.Q1. Similarly
for agent 2, the problem is to maximize U1(y1, y2,m2)
subject to p1.y1 + p2.y2 + m2 = M2 + p2.Q2. Solv-
ing those two maximization exercises by Lagrange multi-
plier and applying the condition that the market remains
in equilibrium, the competitive price vector (pˆ1, pˆ2) as
pˆi = (αi/αm)(M1 + M2)/Qi for i = 1, 2 is found
(Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti (2009)).
The outcomes of such a trading process are then:
1. At optimal prices (pˆ1, pˆ2), m1(t) +m2(t) = m1(t+
1) +m2(t + 1), i.e., demand matches supply in all
market at the market-determined price in equilib-
rium. Since money is also treated as a commod-
ity in this framework, its demand (i.e. the total
amount of money held by the two persons after
trade) must be equal to what was supplied (i.e. the
total amount of money held by them before trade).
2. If a restrictive assumption is made such that α1
in the utility function can vary randomly over time
with αm remaining constant. It readily follows that
α2 also varies randomly over time with the restric-
tion that the sum of α1 and α2 is a constant (1-αm).
Then in the money demand equations derived, if we
suppose αm is λ and α1/(α1 + α2) is , it is found
that money evolution equations become
m1(t+ 1) = λm1(t) + (1− λ)(m1(t) +m2(t))
m2(t+ 1) = λm2(t) + (1− )(1− λ)(m1(t) +m2(t)).
For a fixed value of λ, if α1 (or α2) is a random
variable with uniform distribution over the domain
[0, 1 − λ], then  is also uniformly distributed over
the domain [0, 1]. This limit corresponds to the
Chakraborti and Chakrabarti (2000) model, dis-
cussed earlier.
3. For the limiting value of αm in the utility function
(i.e. αm → 0 which implies λ → 0), the money
transfer equation describing the random sharing of
money without saving is obtained, which was stud-
ied by Dragulescu and Yakovenko (2000) mentioned
earlier.
This actually demonstrates the equivalence of the two
maximizations principles of entropy (in physics) and util-
ity (in economics), and is certainly noteworthy.
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IV. AGENT-BASED MODELLING BASED ON GAMES
A. Minority Game models
1. El Farol Bar Problem
Arthur (1994) introduced the ‘El Farol Bar’ problem as
a paradigm of complex economic systems. In this prob-
lem, a population of agents have to decide whether to go
to the bar opposite Santa Fe, every Thursday night. Due
to a limited number of seats, the bar cannot entertain
more than X% of the population. If less than X% of the
population go to the bar, the time spent in the bar is
considered to be satisfying and it is better to attend the
bar rather than staying at home. But if more than X%
of the population go to the bar, then it is too crowded
and people in the bar have an unsatisfying time. In this
second case, staying at home is considered to be better
choice than attending the bar. So, in order to optimise
its own utility, each agent has to predict what everybody
else will do.
In particular Arthur was also interested in agents who
have bounds on “rationality”, i.e. agents who:
• do not have perfect information about their envi-
ronment, in general they will only acquire infor-
mation through interaction with the dynamically
changing environment;
• do not have a perfect model of their environment;
• have limited computational power, so they can’t
work out all the logical consequences of their knowl-
edge;
• have other resource limitations (e.g. memory).
In order to take these limitations into account, each agent
is randomly given a fixed menu of models potentially suit-
able to predict the number of people who will go the bar
given past data (e.g. the same as two weeks ago, the av-
erage of the past few weeks, etc.). Each week, each agent
evaluates these models against the past data. He chooses
the one that was the best predictor on this data and then
uses it to predict the number of people who will go to the
bar this time. If this prediction is less than X , then the
agent decides to go to the bar as well. If its prediction
is more than X , the agent stays home. Thus, in order to
make decisions on whether to attend the bar, all the indi-
viduals are equipped with certain number of “strategies”,
which provide them the predictions of the attendance in
the bar next week, based on the attendance in the past
few weeks. As a result the number who go to the bar
oscillates in an apparently random manner around the
critical X% mark.
This was one of the first models that led a way different
from traditional economics.
2. Basic Minority game
The Minority Games (abbreviated MGs) (Challet et al.
(2004)) refer to the multi-agent models of financial mar-
kets with the original formulation introduced by Challet
and Zhang (1997), and all other variants (Coolen (2005);
Lamper et al. (2002)), most of which share the principal
features that the models are repeated games and agents
are inductive in nature. The original formulation of the
Minority Game by Challet and Zhang (1997) is some-
times referred as the “Original Minority Game” or the
“Basic Minority Game”.
The basic minority game consists of N (odd natural
number) agents, who choose between one of the two de-
cisions at each round of the game, using their own sim-
ple inductive strategies. The two decisions could be, for
example, “buying” or “selling” commodities/assets, de-
noted by 0 or 1, at a given time t. An agent wins the
game if it is one of the members of the minority group,
and thus at each round, the minority group of agents
win the game and rewards are given to those strategies
that predict the winning side. All the agents have ac-
cess to finite amount of public information, which is a
common bit-string “memory” of the M most recent out-
comes, composed of the winning sides in the past few
rounds. Thus the agents with finite memory are said to
exhibit “bounded rationality” (Arthur (1994)).
Consider for example, memory M = 2; then there are
P = 2M = 4 possible “history” bit strings: 00, 01, 10
and 11. A “strategy” consists of a response, i.e., 0 or 1,
to each possible history bit strings; therefore, there are
G = 2P = 22
M
= 16 possible strategies which consti-
tute the “strategy space”. At the beginning of the game,
each agent randomly picks k strategies, and after the
game, assigns one “virtual” point to a strategy which
would have predicted the correct outcome. The actual
performance r of the player is measured by the number
of times the player wins, and the strategy, using which
the player wins, gets a “real” point. A record of the
number of agents who have chosen a particular action,
say, “selling” denoted by 1, A1(t) as a function of time
is kept (see Fig. 14). The fluctuations in the behaviour
of A1(t) actually indicate the system’s total utility. For
example, we can have a situation where only one player
is in the minority and all the other players lose. The
other extreme case is when (N − 1)/2 players are in the
minority and (N + 1)/2 players lose. The total utility
of the system is obviously greater for the latter case and
from this perspective, the latter situation is more desir-
able. Therefore, the system is more efficient when there
are smaller fluctuations around the mean than when the
fluctuations are larger.
As in the El Farol bar problem, unlike most traditional
economics models which assume agents are “deductive”
in nature, here too a “trial-and-error” inductive thinking
approach is implicitly implemented in process of decision-
making when agents make their choices in the games.
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FIG. 14. Attendance fluctuation and performances of players
in Basic Minority Game. Plots of (a) attendance and (b)
performance of the players (five curves are: the best, the worst
and three randomly chosen) for the basic minority game with
N = 801; M = 6; k = 10 and T = 5000. Reproduced from
Sysi-Aho et al. (2003b).
3. Evolutionary minority games
Challet generalized the basic minority game (see Chal-
let and Zhang (1997, 1998)) mentioned above to include
the Darwinian selection: the worst player is replaced by
a new one after some time steps, the new player is a
“clone” of the best player, i.e. it inherits all the strate-
gies but with corresponding virtual capitals reset to zero
(analogous to a new born baby, though having all the
predispositions from the parents, does not inherit their
knowledge). To keep a certain diversity they introduced
a mutation possibility in cloning. They allowed one of the
strategies of the best player to be replaced by a new one.
Since strategies are not just recycled among the play-
ers any more, the whole strategy phase space is available
for selection. They expected this population to be capa-
ble of “learning” since bad players are weeded out with
time, and fighting is among the so-to-speak the “best”
players. Indeed in Fig. 15, they observed that the learn-
ing emerged in time. Fluctuations are reduced and sat-
urated, this implies the average gain for everybody is
improved but never reaches the ideal limit.
Li et al. (2000a,b) also studied the minority game in
the presence of “evolution”. In particular, they exam-
ined the behaviour in games in which the dimension of
the strategy space, m, is the same for all agents and fixed
for all time. They found that for all values of m, not too
large, evolution results in a substantial improvement in
overall system performance. They also showed that after
evolution, results obeyed a scaling relation among games
played with different values ofm and different numbers of
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FIG. 15. Temporal attendance of A for the genetic approach
showing a learning process. Reproduced from Challet and
Zhang (1997)
agents, analogous to that found in the non-evolutionary,
adaptive games (see remarks on section IVA5). Best
system performance still occurred, for a given number of
agents, at mc, the same value of the dimension of the
strategy space as in the non-evolutionary case, but sys-
tem performance was nearly an order of magnitude bet-
ter than the non-evolutionary result. For m < mc, the
system evolved to states in which average agent wealth
was better than in the random choice game. As m be-
came large, overall systems performance approached that
of the random choice game.
Li et al. (2000a,b) continued the study of evolution in
minority games by examining games in which agents with
poorly performing strategies can trade in their strategies
for new ones from a different strategy space, which meant
allowing for strategies that use information from different
numbers of time lags, m. They found, in all the games,
that after evolution, wealth per agent is high for agents
with strategies drawn from small strategy spaces (small
m), and low for agents with strategies drawn from large
strategy spaces (large m). In the game played with N
agents, wealth per agent as a function of m was very
nearly a step function. The transition was found to be
at m = mt, where mt ' mc − 1, and mc is the critical
value of m at which N agents playing the game with
a fixed strategy space (fixed m) have the best emer-
gent coordination and the best utilization of resources.
They also found that overall system-wide utilization of
resources is independent of N . Furthermore, although
overall system-wide utilization of resources after evolu-
tion varied somewhat depending on some other aspects of
the evolutionary dynamics, in the best cases, utilization
of resources was on the order of the best results achieved
in evolutionary games with fixed strategy spaces.
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FIG. 16. Schematic diagram to illustrate the mechanism of
one-point genetic crossover for producing new strategies. The
strategies si and sj are the parents. We choose the breaking
point randomly and through this one-point genetic crossover,
the children sk and sl are produced and substitute the par-
ents. Reproduced from Sysi-Aho et al. (2003b).
4. Adaptive minority games
Sysi-Aho et al. (2003a,c,b, 2004) presented a simple
modification of the basic minority game where the play-
ers modify their strategies periodically after every time
interval τ , depending on their performances: if a player
finds that he is among the fraction n (where 0 < n < 1)
who are the worst performing players, he adapts him-
self and modifies his strategies. They proposed that the
agents use hybridized one-point genetic crossover mecha-
nism (as shown in Fig. 16), inspired by genetic evolution
in biology, to modify the strategies and replace the bad
strategies. They studied the performances of the agents
under different conditions and investigate how they adapt
themselves in order to survive or be the best, by find-
ing new strategies using the highly effective mechanism.
They also studied the measure of total utility of the sys-
tem U(xt), which is the number of players in the minority
group; the total utility of the system is maximum Umax as
the highest number of players win is equal to (N − 1)/2.
The system is more efficient when the deviations from
the maximum total utility Umax are smaller, or in other
words, the fluctuations in A1(t) around the mean become
smaller.
Interestingly, the fluctuations disappear totally and
the system stabilizes to a state where the total utility
of the system is at maximum, since at each time step the
highest number of players win the game (see Fig. 17).
As expected, the behaviour depends on the parameter
values for the system (see Sysi-Aho et al. (2003b, 2004)).
They used the utility function to study the efficiency and
dynamics of the game as shown in Fig. 18. If the par-
ents are chosen randomly from the pool of strategies then
the mechanism represents a “one-point genetic crossover”
and if the parents are the best strategies then the mech-
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FIG. 17. Plot to show the time variations of the number of
players A1 who choose action 1, with the parameters N =
1001, m = 5, s = 10 and t = 4000 for (a) basic minority
game and (b) adaptive game, where τ = 25 and n = 0.6.
Reproduced from Sysi-Aho et al. (2003b).
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FIG. 18. Plot to show the variation of total utility of the
system with time for the basic minority game for N = 1001,
m = 5, s = 10, t = 5000, and adaptive game, for the same
parameters but different values of τ and n. Each point rep-
resents a time average of the total utility for separate bins of
size 50 time-steps of the game. The maximum total utility
(= (N − 1)/2) is shown as a dashed line. The data for the
basic minority game is shown in circles. The plus signs are
for τ = 10 and n = 0.6; the asterisk marks are for τ = 50 an
n = 0.6; the cross marks for τ = 10 and n = 0.2 and trian-
gles for τ = 50 and n = 0.2. The ensemble average over 70
different samples was taken in each case. Reproduced from
Sysi-Aho et al. (2003b).
anism represents a “hybridized genetic crossover”. The
children may replace parents or two worst strategies and
accordingly four different interesting cases arise: (a) one-
point genetic crossover with parents “killed”, i.e. par-
ents are replaced by the children, (b) one-point genetic
crossover with parents “saved”, i.e. the two worst strate-
gies are replaced by the children but the parents are
retained, (c) hybridized genetic crossover with parents
“killed” and (d) hybridized genetic crossover with par-
ents “saved”.
In order to determine which mechanism is the most
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FIG. 19. Plots of the attendances by choosing parents ran-
domly (a) and (b), and using the best parents in a player’s
pool (c) and (d). In (a) and (c) case parents are replaced
by children and in (b) and (d) case children replace the two
worst strategies. Simulations have been done with N = 801,
M = 6, k = 16, t = 40, n = 0.4 and T = 10000.
efficient, we have made a comparative study of the four
cases, mentioned above. We plot the attendance as a
function of time for the different mechanisms in Fig. 19.
In Fig. 20 we show the total utility of the system in each
of the cases (a)-(d), where we have plotted results of the
average over 100 runs and each point in the utility curve
represents a time average taken over a bin of length 50
time-steps. The simulation time is doubled from those
in Fig. 19, in order to expose the asymptotic behaviour
better. On the basis of Figs. 19 and 20, we find that
the case (d) is the most efficient. In order to investi-
gate what happens in the level of an individual agent,
we created a competitive surrounding– “test” situation
where after T = 3120 time-steps, six players begin to
adapt and modify their strategies such that three are us-
ing hybridized genetic crossover mechanism and the other
three one point genetic crossover, where children replace
the parents. The rest of the players play the basic mi-
nority game. In this case it turns out that in the end
the best players are those who use the hybridized mech-
anism, second best are those using the one-point mecha-
nism, and the bad players those who do not adapt at all.
In addition it turns out that the competition amongst the
players who adapt using the hybridized genetic crossover
mechanism is severe.
It should be noted that the mechanism of evolution of
strategies is considerably different from earlier attempts
such as Challet and Zhang (1997) or Li et al. (2000a,b).
This is because in this mechanism the strategies are
changed by the agents themselves and even though the
strategy space evolves continuously, its size and dimen-
sionality remain the same.
Due to the simplicity of these models (Sysi-Aho et al.
FIG. 20. Plots of the scaled utilities of the four different
mechanisms in comparison with that of the basic minority
game. Each curve represents an ensemble average over 100
runs and each point in a curve is a time average over a bin
of length 50 time-steps. In the inset, the quantity (1− U) is
plotted against scaled time in the double logarithmic scale.
Simulations are done with N = 801, M = 6, k = 16, t = 40,
n = 0.4 and T = 20000. Reproduced from Sysi-Aho et al.
(2003b).
(2003a,c,b, 2004)), a lot of freedom is found in modi-
fying the models to make the situations more realistic
and applicable to many real dynamical systems, and not
only financial markets. Many details in the model can
be fine-tuned to imitate the real markets or behaviour of
other complex systems. Many other sophisticated mod-
els based on these games can be setup and implemented,
which show a great potential over the commonly adopted
statistical techniques in analyses of financial markets.
5. Remarks
For modelling purposes, the minority game models
were meant to serve as a class of simple models which
could produce some macroscopic features observed in
the real financial markets, which included the fat-tail
price return distribution and volatility clustering (Chal-
let et al. (2004); Coolen (2005)). Despite the hectic ac-
tivity (Challet and Zhang (1998); Challet et al. (2000))
they have failed to capture or reproduce most impor-
tant stylized facts of the real markets. However, in the
physicists’ community, they have become an interesting
and established class of models where the physics of dis-
ordered systems (Cavagna et al. (1999); Challet et al.
(2000)), lending a large amount of physical insights (Savit
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FIG. 21. The simulation results of the variance in attendance
σ2/N as a function of the control parameter α = 2M/N for
games with k = 2 strategies for each agent, ensemble averaged
over 100 sample runs. Dotted line shows the value of volatility
in random choice limit. Solid line shows the critical value
of α = αc ≈ 0.3374. Reproduced from Yeung and Zhang
arxiv:0811.1479.
et al. (1999); Martino et al. (2004)). Since in the BMG
model a Hamiltonian function could be defined and an-
alytic solutions could be developed in some regimes of
the model, the model was viewed with a more physical
picture. In fact, it is characterized by a clear two-phase
structure with very different collective behaviours in the
two phases, as in many known conventional physical sys-
tems (Savit et al. (1999); Cavagna et al. (1999)).
Savit et al. (1999) first found that the macroscopic be-
haviour of the system does not depend independently on
the parameters N and M , but instead depends on the
ratio
α ≡ 2
M
N
=
P
N
(35)
which serves as the most important control parameter
in the game. The variance in the attendance (see also
Sysi-Aho et al. (2003c)) or volatility σ2/N , for different
values of N and M depend only on the ratio α. Fig. 21
shows a plot of σ2/N against the control parameter α,
where the data collapse of σ2/N for different values of
N and M is clearly evident. The dotted line in Fig. 21
corresponds to the “coin-toss” limit (random choice or
pure chance limit), in which agents play by simply mak-
ing random decisions (by coin-tossing) at every rounds
of the game. This value of σ2/N in coin-toss limit can
be obtained by simply assuming a binomial distribution
of the agents’ binary actions, with probability 0.5, such
that σ2/N = 0.5(1 − 0.5) · 4 = 1. When α is small, the
value of σ2/N of the game is larger than the coin-toss
limit which implies the collective behaviours of agents are
worse than the random choices. In the early literature, it
was popularly called as the worse-than-random regime.
When α increases, the value of σ2/N decreases and en-
ters a region where agents are performing better than
the random choices, which was popularly called as the
better-than-random regime. The value of σ2/N reaches
a minimum value which is substantially smaller than the
coin-toss limit. When α further increases, the value of
σ2/N increases again and approaches the coin-toss limit.
This allowed one to identify two phases in the Minority
Game, as separated by the minimum value of σ2/N in
the graph. The value of α where the rescaled volatility
attended its minimum was denoted by αc, which repre-
sented the phase transition point; αc has been shown to
have a value of 0.3374 . . . (for k = 2) by analytical calcu-
lations Challet et al. (2000).
Besides these collective behaviours, physicists became
also interested in the dynamics of the games such as
crowd vs anti-crowd movement of agents, periodic attrac-
tors, etc. (Johnson et al. (1999a,b); Hart et al. (2001)).
In this way, the Minority Games serve as a useful tool
and provide a new direction for physicists in viewing and
analysing the underlying dynamics of complex evolving
systems such as the financial markets.
B. The Kolkata Paise Restaurant (KPR) problem
The KPR problem (Chakrabarti et al. (2009); Ghosh
and Chakrabarti (2009); Ghosh et al. (2010a,b)) is a re-
peated game, played between a large number N of agents
having no interaction amongst themselves. In KPR
problem, prospective customers (agents) choose from N
restaurants each evening simultaneously (in parallel de-
cision mode); N is fixed. Each restaurant has the same
price for a meal but a different rank (agreed upon by all
customers) and can serve only one customer any evening.
Information regarding the customer distributions for ear-
lier evenings is available to everyone. Each customer’s
objective is to go to the restaurant with the highest pos-
sible rank while avoiding the crowd so as to be able to
get dinner there. If more than one customer arrives at
any restaurant on any evening, one of them is randomly
chosen (each of them are anonymously treated) and is
served. The rest do not get dinner that evening.
In Kolkata, there were very cheap and fixed rate “Paise
Restaurants” that were popular among the daily labour-
ers in the city. During lunch hours, the labourers used to
walk (to save the transport costs) to one of these restau-
rants and would miss lunch if they got to a restaurant
where there were too many customers. Walking down to
the next restaurant would mean failing to report back to
work on time! Paise is the smallest Indian coin and there
were indeed some well-known rankings of these restau-
rants, as some of them would offer tastier items compared
to the others. A more general example of such a problem
would be when the society provides hospitals (and beds)
in every locality but the local patients go to hospitals
of better rank (commonly perceived) elsewhere, thereby
competing with the local patients of those hospitals. Un-
availability of treatment in time may be considered as
lack of the service for those people and consequently as
25
(social) wastage of service by those unattended hospitals.
A dictator’s solution to the KPR problem is the follow-
ing: the dictator asks everyone to form a queue and then
assigns each one a restaurant with rank matching the se-
quence of the person in the queue on the first evening.
Then each person is told to go to the next ranked restau-
rant in the following evening (for the person in the last
ranked restaurant this means going to the first ranked
restaurant). This shift proceeds then continuously for
successive evenings. This is clearly one of the most effi-
cient solution (with utilization fraction f¯ of the services
by the restaurants equal to unity) and the system arrives
at this this solution immediately (from the first evening
itself). However, in reality this cannot be the true solu-
tion of the KPR problem, where each agent decides on his
own (in parallel or democratically) every evening, based
on complete information about past events. In this game,
the customers try to evolve a learning strategy to even-
tually get dinners at the best possible ranked restaurant,
avoiding the crowd. It is seen, the evolution these strate-
gies take considerable time to converge and even then the
eventual utilization fraction f¯ is far below unity.
Let the symmetric stochastic strategy chosen by each
agent be such that at any time t, the probability pk(t) to
arrive at the k-th ranked restaurant is given by
pk(t) =
1
z
[
kα exp
(
−nk(t− 1)
T
)]
,
z =
N∑
k=1
[
kα exp
(
−nk(t− 1)
T
)]
, (36)
where nk(t) denotes the number of agents arriving at the
k-th ranked restaurant in period t, T > 0 is a scaling
factor and α ≥ 0 is an exponent.
For any natural number α and T →∞, an agent goes
to the k-th ranked restaurant with probability pk(t) =
kα/
∑
kα; which means in the limit T →∞ in (36) gives
pk(t) = k
α/
∑
kα.
If an agent selects any restaurant with equal probabil-
ity p then probability that a single restaurant is chosen
by m agents is given by
∆(m) =
(
N
m
)
pm(1− p)N−m. (37)
Therefore, the probability that a restaurant with rank k
is not chosen by any of the agents will be given by
∆k(m = 0) =
(
N
0
)
(1− pk)N ; pk = k
α∑
kα
' exp
(−kαN
N˜
)
as N →∞, (38)
where N˜ =
∑N
k=1 k
α ' ∫ N0 kαdk = Nα+1(α+1) . Hence
∆k(m = 0) = exp
(
−k
α (α+ 1)
Nα
)
. (39)
Therefore the average fraction of agents getting dinner in
the k-th ranked restaurant is given by
f¯k = 1−∆k (m = 0) . (40)
Naturally for α = 0, the problem corresponding to
random choice f¯k = 1 − e−1, giving f¯ =
∑
f¯k/N ' 0.63
and for α = 1, f¯k = 1 − e−2k/N giving f¯ =
∑
f¯k/N '
0.58.
In summary, in the KPR problem where the decision
made by each agent in each evening t is independent
and is based on the information about the rank k of
the restaurants and their occupancy given by the num-
bers nk(t − 1) . . . nk(0). For several stochastic strate-
gies, only nk(t − 1) is utilized and each agent chooses
the k-th ranked restaurant with probability pk(t) given
by Eq. (36). The utilization fraction fk of the k-th
ranked restaurants on every evening is studied and their
average (over k) distributions D(f) are studied numeri-
cally, as well as analytically, and one finds (Chakrabarti
et al. (2009); Ghosh and Chakrabarti (2009); Ghosh
et al. (2010a)) their distributions to be Gaussian with
the most probable utilization fraction f¯ ' 0.63, 0.58
and 0.46 for the cases with α = 0, T → ∞; α = 1,
T →∞; and α = 0, T → 0 respectively. For the stochas-
tic crowd-avoiding strategy discussed in Ghosh et al.
(2010b), where pk(t+1) =
1
nk(t)
for k = k0 the restaurant
visited by the agent last evening, and = 1/(N− 1) for all
other restaurants (k 6= k0), one gets the best utilization
fraction f¯ ' 0.8, and the analytical estimates for f¯ in
these limits agree very well with the numerical observa-
tions. Also, the time required to converge to the above
value of f¯ is independent of N .
The KPR problem has similarity with the Minority
Game Problem (Arthur (1994); Challet et al. (2004)) as
in both the games, herding behaviour is punished and
diversity’s encouraged. Also, both involves learning of
the agents from the past successes etc. Of course, KPR
has some simple exact solution limits, a few of which are
discussed here. The real challenge is, of course, to de-
sign algorithms of learning mixed strategies (e.g., from
the pool discussed here) by the agents so that the fair so-
cial norm emerges eventually (in N0 or lnN order time)
even when every one decides on the basis of their own
information independently. As we have seen, some naive
strategies give better values of f¯ compared to most of the
“smarter” strategies like strict crowd-avoiding strategies,
etc. This observation in fact compares well with earlier
observation in minority games (see e.g. Satinover and
Sornette (2007)).
It may be noted that all the stochastic strategies, being
parallel in computational mode, have the advantage that
they converge to solution at smaller time steps (∼ N0 or
lnN) while for deterministic strategies the convergence
time is typically of order of N , which renders such strate-
gies useless in the truly macroscopic (N → ∞) limits.
However, deterministic strategies are useful when N is
small and rational agents can design appropriate punish-
ment schemes for the deviators (see Kandori (2008)).
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The study of the KPR problem shows that while a
dictated solution leads to one of the best possible solution
to the problem, with each agent getting his dinner at the
best ranked restaurant with a period of N evenings, and
with best possible value of f¯ (= 1) starting from the first
evening itself. The parallel decision strategies (employing
evolving algorithms by the agents, and past informations,
e.g., of n(t)), which are necessarily parallel among the
agents and stochastic (as in democracy), are less efficient
(f¯  1; the best one discussed in Ghosh et al. (2010b),
giving f¯ ' 0.8 only). Note here that the time required
is not dependent on N . We also note that most of the
“smarter” strategies lead to much lower efficiency.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
Agent-based models of order books are a good ex-
ample of interactions between ideas and methods that
are usually linked either to Economics and Finance (mi-
crostructure of markets, agent interaction) or to Physics
(reaction-diffusion processes, deposition-evaporation pro-
cess, kinetic theory of gases). As of today, existing mod-
els exhibit a trade-off between “realism” and calibration
in its mechanisms and processes (empirical models such
as Mike and Farmer (2008)), and explanatory power of
simple observed behaviours (Cont and Bouchaud (2000);
Cont (2007) for example). In the first case, some of the
“stylized facts” may be reproduced, but using empiri-
cal processes that may not be linked to any behaviour
observed on the market. In the second case, these are
only toy models that cannot be calibrated on data. The
mixing of many features, as in Lux and Marchesi (2000)
and as is usually the case in behavioural finance, leads
to poorly tractable models where the sensitivity to one
parameter is hardly understandable. Therefore, no em-
pirical model can tackle properly empirical facts such as
volatility clustering. Importing toy model features ex-
plaining volatility clustering or market interactions in or-
der book models is yet to be done. Finally, let us also
note that to our knowledge, no agent-based model of or-
der books deals with the multidimensional case. Imple-
menting agents trading simultaneously several assets in
a way that reproduces empirical observations on correla-
tion and dependence remains an open challenge.
We believe this type of modelling is crucial for future
developments in finance. The financial crisis that oc-
curred in 2007-2008 is expected to create a shock in clas-
sic modelling in Economics and Finance. Many scientists
have expressed their views on this subject (e.g. Bouchaud
(2008); Lux and Westerhoff (2009); Farmer and Foley
(2009)) and we believe as well that agent-based models
we have presented here will be at the core of future mod-
elling. As illustrations, let us mention Iori et al. (2006),
which models the interbank market and investigates sys-
temic risk, Thurner et al. (2009), which investigates the
effects of use of leverage and margin calls on the stabil-
ity of a market and Yakovenko and Rosser (2009), which
provides a brief overview of the study of wealth distribu-
tions and inequalities. No doubt these will be followed
by many other contributions.
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